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THE LAW AND LARGE NUMBERS: PRESERVING
ADJUDICATION IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
Alexandra D. Lahav*
Abstract
This Article describes the transfer of power to regulate tortfeasors from
the legislature to private parties through the medium of the court system
and proposes that instead of privatizing mass torts administration courts
should humanize it. The federal courts are faced with large numbers of
claims arising out of torts, civil rights violations, and consumer fraud.
Federal judges, concerned about the transformation of their role from
adjudicators to administrators, have applied various narrowing legal
doctrines to avoid administering mass torts. Because courts have restricted
procedures for resolving mass claims, litigants have resorted to private
ordering through settlement.
The alternative to private settlement is bureaucratic administration of
complex litigation. There are legitimate reasons to fear this outcome, such
as concerns about litigants becoming alienated, capture by special
interests, and erroneous results. These same concerns about bureaucracy
animated the debate over the rise of administrative agencies in the last
century. But bureaucratic administration has its virtues and serves the
broader democratic goal of access to justice. When judges avoid mass
claim administration, they are not deferring to the legislature. Instead, they
are ceding power to private actors. To replace private ordering, courts need
a method for administering large numbers of claims that is both humanized
and humanizing. Such a bureaucracy should be open to public scrutiny and
understood as an important, sophisticated judicial function intended to
realize the widely recognized values of the judicial system.
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I. INTRODUCTION

One tragic aspect of mass torts is that individual harm becomes
routinized. Take the recent regulatory failures at the Food and Drug
Administration that resulted in the sale of drugs posing substantial risks of
dangerous, even fatal, undisclosed side effects.' Two million people,
mostly women, used diet drugs that had harmful side effects, such as an
agonizing death from primary pulmonary hypertension or, in less
egregious cases, heart valve damage.2 Many of these patients sued, and
1. See David Willman, The New FDA: How a New PolicyLed to Seven DeadlyDrugs, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at Al (describing regulatory failure at the FDA); Marcia Angell, Your
DangerousDrugstore,N.Y. REV. OFBOOKS, June 8,2006, at 38-40 (describing the lawsuits arising
out of the problematic approval and marketing of Vioxx).
2. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (mem.);
AucIA MuNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE
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nearly 20,000 such suits ended up in the federal courts.3 To each individual
who suffered health problems as a result of taking these drugs, her case
was unique. From the judicial perspective, however, there were thousands
of similar claims to be administered. Eventually, these cases settled for
more than four billion dollars and a bureaucratic process was created to
administer the claims.4 The creation of such an administrative system in
the shadow of the court affects the core of our conception of justice and
raises the question: To what extent should justice in the federal courts be
mass produced?
This Article describes the procedural limits on access to justice in
complex litigation and proposes a solution to these limitations. A
combination of factors that stem from a shared resistance to bureaucracy
has resulted in the transfer of the power to regulate tortfeasors from the
legislature to private parties through the medium of the court system.
Instead of privatizing mass claims resolution, we should humanize it by
increasing transparency in the claims administration process, injecting
more deliberation and communication into that process, and selfconsciously evaluating judicially administered resolution of mass cases
based on the values of systemic justice and deterrence.
Some observers see the influx of routine tort claims into Article III
courts as a problem to be avoided through jurisdictional limitations that
will have the net effect of reducing the number of such cases filed in
federal courts.5 This is the position that the Federal Judicial Conference
has taken, a position criticized for bringing judicial impartiality on these
very issues into question.' Conversely, various scholars embrace the new
reality, advocating streamlined systems for overseeing mass torts in the
courts and emphasizing efficiency and deterrence as the main goals of the
legal system, especially in the tort area.7 These scholars want courts to
DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN 8 (2001). The details of the diet drug

litigation are discussed infra Part III.
3. See In re Diet Drugs1, 2000 WL 1222042, at *3.
4. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Your ProductsLiabilityHit Parade:A Class Torts "Top 20,"
37 TORT & INS. L.J. 169, 216-17 (2001); see also infratext accompanying notes 163-76.
5. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995), reprintedin 166 F.R.D. 49 (1995) [hereinafter JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S.] (proposing a plan
developed by Federal Judicial Conference to manage increased caseload in the federal courts,
including advocating substantial limitations on diversity jurisdiction).
6. Thejudiciary's collective advocacy for limitations on its own jurisdiction raises concerns
about impartiality. Judith Resnik, TrialAs Error,JurisdictionAs Injury: Transformingthe Meaning
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1026-1029 (2000) (describing the transformation of the
judiciary into an administrative agency with its own interests, and advocating against that agency
taking a stand on various issues affecting the courts because it infringes on the judiciary's
impartiality).
7. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Mandatory-LitigationClass Action: The Only Option
for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 834 (2002).
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adopt the administrative role that judges have been resisting. Neither of
these groups is entirely correct. On one hand, in focusing on the "day-incourt" ideal, judges often neglect to recognize our historic acceptance of
its limitations. Furthermore, judicial attempts to limit access to justice
through various narrowing doctrines have the ironic effect of eroding the
"Hart-Hand model" of adjudication and the day-in-court ideal.' On the
other hand, although administration has its virtues, efficiency is not the
only priority.9 This Article proposes a third way: a humanized approach to
the administration of mass torts worthy of the time, effort, and expertise
of federal judges.
Part II describes the controversy at issue. Courts, inundated with mass
cases and possessing scarce resources, are pushed towards claims
administration rather than adjudication. This Part also sets out the abiding
concerns about bureaucracy in the courts and elsewhere: alienation,
capture, and error. It demonstrates that these same worries were expressed
in the debate over administrative agencies in the last century. Part In
presents a case study, In re Diet Drugs ProductsLiability Litigation (the
Diet Drugs litigation), to explore how mass torts arrive at the courthouse.
This case study demonstrates both the importance of opening the
courthouse door to these cases and the complexity of the issues they
raise.' ° Some of the concerns of judges and commentators about the
administrative structures that have been established to deal with complex
litigation are well founded. Part IV describes how judges resist the
administrative paradigm. Through the narrowing of various doctrines,

8. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Taking BureaucracySeriously, 99 HARv.L.REv. 344,344-45
(1985) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985))
(describing the Hart-Hand or traditional model of adjudication as one in which "federal appellate
judges are members of a small, elite, collegial, deliberative, on-going institution: a court of appeals
[that has as] its hallmark... an adequately reasoned result"). The term might apply equally well
to the district courts. See Ralph Cavanagh & Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and
Beyond a Jurisprudenceof Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & Soc'y REv. 371, 377-78 (1980)
(describing the "traditional" model of adjudication). The day-in-court ideal grew out of "deeprooted historic tradition." See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (referring to "our 'deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court"'); see also Robert G.
Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" IdealandNon-PartyPreclusion,67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 193, 196
(1992).
9. "Efficiency principles are easy to apply; more ambiguous policies such as federalism and
fairness are difficult to employ." Edward Brunet, The Triumph ofEfficiency and DiscretionOver
Competing Complex LitigationPolicies, 10 REv. LITIG. 273,277 (1991). For a nuanced discussion
of the relationship between the regulatory and adjudicatory roles of the courts, see MEIR DANCOHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY
125-128 (1985) (describing two prevalent models of adjudication, the arbitration and regulation
models, and arguing that these models present a division of labor rather than merely a tension
between opposing views of the role of the courts).
10. See infra Part III.
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judges have avoided administering mass cases directly and pushed those
cases into private claims administration facilities created by settlement.
Finally, Part V sets forth an agenda for developing a humanizing
administrative response to mass torts and similar types of cases.
II. THE CONTROVERSY

Mass torts, such as the Diet Drugs litigation, challenge judges' views
of themselves as rendering handcrafted justice and overseeing the
adjudication of cases, rather than merely administering claims. Judges and
other constant participants in the federal court system have been
bemoaning the decline of the federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction
with special stature for at least fifty years." Judges have long been
concerned that, among other things, the influx of tort cases requires an
increase in the number of federal judges that is "bound to depreciate the
quality of the federal judiciary and thereby adversely affect our whole
system." 2 This is a lament for the legal process ideal of adjudication,
which posits an impartial judge affording parties an opportunity to be
heard, deciding cases by applying legal rules to the facts presented, and
producing a reasoned opinion documenting the decision. 3 When discussed

11. "The business of the courts, particularly the federal courts, is drastically unlike the
business of factories. The function and role of the courts and the nature of their judicial process
involve impalpable factors, subtle but far reaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the
judicial plant." Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See generally HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 31
(1973) (noting the negative impact of increased dockets on the courts of appeals); RICHARD A.
POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985) (Seventh Circuit Judge decries the negative
effects of increased caseload and advocates reinvigorating traditional model of adjudication by
limiting federal court jurisdiction), revisedasRICHARDA. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE
AND REFORM (1995); Paul D. Carrington, CrowdedDocketsandthe CourtsofAppeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542 (1969) (lamenting the
effect of increased dockets on the courts of appeals); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy- the
Carcinoma in the FederalJudiciary,31 ALA. L. REV. 261 (1980) (United States District Court
Judge, E.D. Texas, now on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, argues against the increasing
bureaucratization of the courts and erosion of"classic" view ofjudge's role); Richard B. Hoffman,
BureaucraticSpectre: The Newest Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60, 68 (1981) (chief
deputy clerk of the District of Columbia Court ofAppeals writes "the function ofjudges is to judge,
not to administer"); Wade H. McCree, BureaucraticJustice:An Early Warning, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
777 (1981) (Solicitor General of the United States argues against erosion oftraditional adjudication
as a result of influx of cases into the federal courts).
12. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 348 U.S. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
13. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978); see also Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 8, at 378 (describing Fuller's model ofjudge as
follows: he or she "(1) must be impartial; (2) must afford interested parties a meaningful
opportunity to be heard; and (3) must decide cases by applying legal rules to facts adduced in the
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from the perspective of judges, this tradition has been called the "HartHand model" of adjudication.14 Litigants know it as the "day-in-court"
ideal. 1
The federal courts, inundated with cases and faced with limited
resources, have increasingly searched for ways to exclude mass cases from
the federal docket or for more streamlined methods of resolving them.
Judges have regarded the latter strategy with suspicion because of the fear
that administration will alienate litigants, permit interest groups to capture
the administrative system, and result in errors. This disquiet echoes
concerns of an earlier era about the ability and propriety of legislative
delegation of tasks to administrative agencies.
A. Courts Are Inundatedwith Cases and Have Scarce Resources
It is now a commonplace observation that the federal court system is
inundated with a large number of claims and that the basis of the day-incourt ideal-the trial-is vanishing.' 6 The federal judiciary has more than
doubled in the last forty years, growing from 279 district judges in 1962
to 615 in 2002.17 Caseloads outstripped the growing judicial ranks, also
more than doubling from 196 filings per sitting judge in 1962 to 443 in
2002.18 Civil filings rose 16% between 1990 and 2005.'9 Cases awaiting
trial languish.2 ° Instead, cases are being disposed of in ways other than by

course of the proceedings.").
14. Monaghan, supra note 8, at 344-45 (describing the Hart-Hand, or traditional, model of
adjudication as one in which "federal appellate judges are members of a small, elite, congenial,
deliberative, on-going institution: a court of appeals [that has as] its hallmark... an adequately
reasoned result"). Monaghan was applying this term to the appellate courts, but I think it also has
some resonance with respect to district courts.
15. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (referring to "our 'deep-rooted historic
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court' (quoting 18 CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COUPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417
(1981))); Bone, supra note 8, at 196.
16. See generally Patricia Lee Refo, Introduction, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD., at v (2004).
17. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 500 (2004). The federal judiciary
grew more than threefold in sixty years, from 191 district judges in 1948 to 680 in 2004. See
Russell R. Wheeler & Cynthia Harrison, Creatingthe FederalJudicialSystem,3 FED. JUD. CENTER
1, 23, 26 (2005).
18. See Galanter, supra note 17, at 501.
19. Compare JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 15 (stating that in 1990, 217,879 civil
cases were filed), with Federal Court Management Statistics 2005, U.S. District Court-Judicial
Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2005.pl (stating that the number rose to
253,273 in 2005).
20. The median time from filing to trial in federal district court was 22.5 months in 2005. See
Federal Court Management Statistics 2005, U.S. District Court-Judicial Caseload Profile,
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a trial, such as alternative dispute resolution, settlement, or pretrial
disposition.2
This Article explores the periodic barrages of tort suits in the federal
courts such as the influx of lawsuits concerning silicone breast implants.2
Twenty percent of the cases terminated in the federal courts in the fiscal
years 2002 to 2003 were tort cases.2 3 Although tort cases disposed of in
federal courts have fluctuated in the last twenty years, averaging around
44,770 per year, the rate of trials has declined by almost 80%.24 At least in
part, the low ratio of trials to tort cases filed can be attributed to
settlements.25 Class actions play a role in this. When the number of civil
trials is low, the number of class action filings tends to increase. Likewise,
when the number of civil trials is high, the number of class action filings
tends to decrease.26 As Marc Galanter explains, "lawyers who file claims
as class actions remove a large number of claims from the possibility of
being tried individually and replace them with a much smaller number of
cases in a category that very rarely eventuates in a trial. 27
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2005.pl. 14.9% of the civil cases were more than three years
old. See id. In 1990, only 10.6% of the cases were over three years old. See U.S. District Courts
Civil Cases Pending by Length of Time Pending, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfacts
figures/Table4 11.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
21. See Galanter, supra note 17, at 522-31 (analyzing the decline of trials and increase in
non-trial adjudication, such as summary judgment and settlement); Judith Resnik, Migrating,
Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empiricaland Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783,787 (2004) [hereinafter Resnik, Migrating](arguing that
although there is a rarity of trials in courts, adjudication is happening in other forums, many of them
private, and advocating increased public access to these forums); cf Gillian K. Hadfield, Where
Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and StatisticalArtifacts in the
ChangingDisposition of FederalCivil Cases, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 730-31 (2004)
(describing the inaccuracy of statistics concerning dispositions of cases in the federal courts and
presenting tentative findings that the vanishing trials have been replaced by non-trial adjudication
and, potentially, that settlements have also decreased as a result of non-trial adjudications).
22. See Galanter, supra note 17, at 491 n.63. The two largest filings with the Multi-District
Litigation (MDL) Panel were asbestos (106,069 cases) and breast implant litigation (27,526 cases).
See id.
23. See Thomas H. Cohen, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 2002-03, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT. BULL., Aug. 2005, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fttv03.pdf.
24. See Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, Dep't of Justice, Number of Federal Tort
Trials Fell by Almost 80 Percent from 1985 Through 2003 (Aug. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/2005/fttv03pr.htm. The peak, or, depending on your point of
view, nadir, of case disposition was reached in 1999 when 60,941 tort cases were concluded in the
federal courts, 61% of which were products liability cases. See id.
25. See Galanter, supra note 17, at 466-67 (writing that the drop in tort trial rates in part
reflects the arrival of mass settlements, but since "the drop in trial rates has been steady and
prolonged, antedating the era of mass tort settlements, and since a comparable decrease appears in
other kinds of cases as well, it presumably reflects other factors in addition to mass settlements").
26. See id.at 485.
27. Id.at 487.
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This influx of claims has resulted in the advent of administrative rather
than adjudicatory forms of structuring claims resolution, including mass
tort settlements. Administration of claims in the courts is characterized by
centralization of large numbers of claims in a single forum that metes out
non-individualized solutions.2" Contrast this with the day-in-court ideal:
an individual trial in which a generalist judge (or jury) deliberates and
applies legal rules to an individual case. Court business has been
transformed "from cases to litigation," changing the dynamic of the
litigation process from a local, individual, and particularistic provision of
justice to resolution of collective claims on a national scale.2 9
The federal courts centralize all manner of substantive cases through
various procedural mechanisms. Such cases might include the following:
civil rights actions, such as employment discrimination or allegations of
systemic Fourth Amendment violations based on a governmental policy
or practice; torts, such as mass accidents or products liability cases; or
allegations of violations of consumer protection laws. Even cases that do
not cross geographic boundaries, such as most environmental tort claims,
require some level of centralization by the courts because these cases
address the same issues of fact and law applied to many individuals. Such
cases are more efficiently brought in aggregation or as one action, rather
than as a series of individual suits. I will focus on mass torts here, but
these other areas of the law are equally relevant.
The procedural mechanisms for centralizing cases include the class
action rule, the consolidation of trials, the Multiparty Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction statute, and the Multi-District Litigation (MDL) statute. 30 The
centralized forum may be a court, a trust administering a claims resolution
facility or less formal aggregation, and consolidation processes within law
firms or groups of firms. The individual remedies for these collective
claims resemble administrative agencies more than traditional
adjudication.
These claims administration systems are created by the courts, private

28. An administration of claims of this type is a bureaucracy, a term that is difficult to define
precisely. Owen M. Fiss "use[s] the term 'bureaucracy' to refer to a complex organization with
three features: (1) a multitude of actors; (2) a division of functions or responsibilities among them;
and (3) a reliance upon a hierarchy as the device to coordinate their activities." Owen M. Fiss, The
Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary,92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1444 (1983).
29. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation,"54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 51-52
(1991). This is the groundbreaking article tracing and analyzing this sea change in the work of the
federal courts.
30. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1369 (West 2007) (providing for federal diversity jurisdiction in civil
actions with minimal diversity that arise out of a single accident involving the deaths of at least
seventy-five natural persons); 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (providing for consolidation of pretrial
proceedings in one court); FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (covering class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)
(covering consolidation).
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litigants, or by consortia of counsel, not by Congress. They do not have the
same powers, permanence, or accountability requirements as
administrative agencies.3" Nevertheless, they are functionally similar.
Sometimes referred to as "claims resolution facilities,"32 the mechanisms
for administration of mass claims described here are "temporary
administrative agencies"33 in that they are created to last only for a fixed
period, usually for a period of years or until all claims submitted within a
prescribed period are resolved by the agency.34 They are quasiadministrative in that they are flexible in their form and the process they
provide claimants is not limited by any particular set of preexisting rules.
These systems are an administrative structure providing nonindividualized resolution for mass claims. Broadly defined, such
administrative structures may include the following: court-created
structures for claim determination by special masters;35 settlements on a
class-wide basis;36 the creation of schedules for claims settlement of
aggregated cases, which has essentially the same effect as a class-wide
settlement without the procedural protections;37 or, in the rare case,
creation of specialized governmental agencies.3" A non-individualized

31. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), for example, has a notice and comment
requirement. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2000); cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking
RegulatoryDemocracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 411 (2005) (describing empirical data illustrating the
limits of public participation in notice and comment processes under the APA).
32. Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities,57 STAN. L.
REv. 1361, 1362 (2005).
33. Martha Minow, Judgefor the Situation:Judge Jack Weinstein, Creatorof Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 CoLuM. L. REv. 2010, 2010 (1997) (describing Judge Weinstein's
creation of temporary administrative agencies).
34. For example, the portion of the Agent Orange claims administration that went directly
to the claimants was structured to last until 1994, at which point the entire fund would be disbursed.
See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249,253 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd in part,vacated in part
per curiam, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003). The Settlement Trust that arose out of the Diet Drugs
litigation did not have a set deadline, but the deadline for submitting claims gave the process
finality. See generally Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In
re Diet Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *26-27 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000)
(mem.) (describing the settlement).
35. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
class-wide determinations of compensatory damages made by statistical sample supervised by a
special master).
36. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (overturning settlement
of asbestos claims).
37. See generally Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1769 (2005) (discussing the use of collective settlements to resolve non-class multiparty litigation).
38. For example, legislation is currentlybeing considered to create an asbestos trust fund. See
USG to Settle Suits Related to Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at C3 (describing Senate bill
to establish $140 billion asbestos trust fund). The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
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solution consists of the allocation of a predetermined, equal amount to
every claimant;3 9 the valuation of claims according to a matrix;40 a
combination of these;41 or a cy pres fund where damages are not directed
to the claimants at all.42 The methods through which claims resolution
facilities administer claims can be seen as a continuum that ranges from
a trial, the most individualistic mechanism, to a cy pres fund, the least
individualized because the money does not go to the claimants. Under the
current system, the most publicly oriented means of resolving claims is
also the most individualistic: adjudication by trial. Most of the nonindividualized methods of claim resolution that are further along the
continuum are ordinarily only found in settlements, which may or may not
be overseen by the courts.4 3
B. The EnduringArguments Against Bureaucracy:Alienation,
Capture,andError
There are three central arguments against the administration of claims
in the courts: alienation, capture, and error. These arguments echo the
fundamental values of procedural due process: "The prevention of
unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and

2001 is another example of a governmental agency created to deal with a mass tort. See Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.71 (2006); see also
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE
VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005) (describing the work of the Fund from the point of view of its
administrator).
39. This is most common in consumer litigation, but it also happens in the tort context. See
In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 1998)
(approving a classwide settlement providing $100,000 to each tort claimant regardless of individual
demonstration of proof).
40. See, e.g., Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re
DietDrugs1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042 at *20-23 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28,2000) (mem.).
41. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, New York City's $50 Million Strip-Search Suit Settlement:
How a Fourth Amendment Violation Became a Mass Tort Lawsuit, FIND LAW, Jan. 15, 2001,
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/sebok/20010115.html (stipulation of settlement on file with author)
(settlement of case alleging unlawful pre-arraignment strip searches in which claimants could either
obtain $250 or fill out claim form with increasingly detailed information to receive more
compensation according to a matrix, or, if they asserted damages above a certain amount, to have
their damages determined by a psychologist).
42. These are generally only permitted with respect to residual, unclaimed funds. See, e.g.,
Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing cases approving use of cy pres doctrine
to distribute class action funds); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 739 F.2d 730, 736 (2d Cir. 1984)
(considering the use ofcy pres distribution for the limited purpose of distributing unclaimed funds).
43. A cy pres fund might be considered public to the extent it involves a public debate before
court approval. See, e.g., In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1031-32 (N.D.
Iil. 2000) (hearing testimony from a number of representatives of communities concerning four
million dollar cy pres fund), af'd,267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2001).
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dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process." The
alienation argument is rooted in the idea of dignity and expresses concerns
about the lack of direct judicial accountability to litigants and stakeholders
in a court-created quasi-administrative agency.45 As a result of this lack of
accountability, bureaucracy is a "rule by nobody." The capture argument
is based on the critique that the divorce between the affected party and the
decision-maker allows for manipulation of the bureaucratic process in
ways adverse to the interests of the claimants. The error argument is an
instrumentalist argument rooted in the idea that process is a means to the
end of accurate claim valuation. When critics of claims administration in
the courts espouse the error argument they argue that in the absence of an
individualized process, claim valuations will be erroneous or will not
reflect the "market" value of the claim, that is, the value of the claim in
light of prior settlements or jury verdicts. This is essentially an argument
that bureaucratic structures are too crude to accurately value claims.
The alienation argument is based on the criticism that bureaucracy is
a rule by nobody.46 The inability of litigants to participate directly in the
process, combined with the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy, results
in the alienation of the judge from the litigants. This state of affairs breeds
apathy in the decision-maker. Based on the work of Hannah Arendt, Owen
Fiss argues that the compartmentalization of tasks and diffusion of
responsibility in the courts renders bureaucracy "a social structure that
makes possible, facilitates, and perhaps even causes the thoughtless use of
public power."'
Private settlements can be a thoughtless use of public power. Most
claimants in mass tort cases never enter a courtroom or appear before a
judge. Because the judge need never look a plaintiff in the eye, she need
not take responsibility for her actions. This is morally suspect because
adjudication is not a rare form of state intervention in ordinary affairs but
rather an "exercise of collective power needed on an almost continuous
basis to assure that social life conforms to the public values."4' Fiss's

44. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
45. For an enlightening discussion on the uses of the term "accountability" as an expression
of an impulse against bureaucracy, see Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the AntiAdministrativeImpulse, 103 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (2005).
46. Fiss, supra note 28, at 1452; see also Joel D. Schwartz, Liberty, Democracy, and the
Origins of American Bureaucracy,97 HARV. L. REv. 815, 830 (1984) (reviewing WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE ROOTSOFAMERICANBUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900(1982)) ("In a 'mon-archy' or 'oligarchy,' one or a few men literally 'rule.' In a 'demo-cracy' the 'people' as a whole exercise 'power'
over their lives. But in a 'bureau-cracy' literally no one rules, no one exercises arete.").
47. Fiss, supra note 28, at 1453. Fiss does not distinguish between the development of
bureaucratic systems of court administration and systems of claims administration. I believe his
critique is relevant to both areas.
48. Id.at 1461.
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critique of bureaucracy is similar to his critique of settlements.4 9 By
encouraging settlements, courts diffuse responsibility for the actions of
private actors, thus diminishing the purpose of litigation as a means of
conforming actions to public values. Because many claims resolution
processes are created through settlement rather than engineered directly by
the courts, the argument is a forceful one.
In mass torts class actions, the argument that bureaucracy is rule by
nobody expresses itself in concerns over adequacy of representation and
manageability. Interpretations of both these doctrines have tilted towards
encouraging the exercise of individual autonomy by class members,
combating the alienation of rule by nobody by injecting the process with
direct claimant participation. This individualistic focus has eroded the
possibilities for collective relief. For example, some courts have held that
litigant autonomy requires a broad right of collateral attack based on
inadequate representation.5" For similar reasons, courts find broad-ranging
class actions unmanageable because individual issues predominate.5
The capture argument is based on the observation that bureaucracy is
characterized by the separation of control over bureaucratic systems from
the subjects of those systems.52 Some examples of the separation of
ownership from control include the relationship between the shareholder
and the corporation or the citizen and the polity, but the critique is equally
applicable to the claimant and the settlement administrator. As a result of
this separation "bureaucratic managers-whether public or private-can
control bureaucratic power in a manner adverse to the interests of the
shareholders or citizens whom they purport to serve."53 This disconnect
between administrators and claimants occurs because administrative

49. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-83 (1984) (arguing
against settlements because, among other things, they prevent law from developing through
reasoned, published opinions).
50. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), affd in part, vacated
in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); see also Patrick Woolley, The Availability of CollateralAttack for
Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEx. L. REV. 383 (2000) (arguing in favor of
traditional, broad collateral attack rule for inadequate representation to preserve autonomy of
individual class members). Compare Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search
for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. M.C.A., Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765
(1998) (arguing against a broad right to collaterally attack class action settlements on the basis of
inadequate representation and proposing a narrower basis for collateral attack), with Henry Paul
Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctionsand PreclusionAgainst Absent, Non-Resident Class Members, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1998) (arguing in favor of a broad right for absent class members to
challenge preclusive class judgments in their chosen forum).
51. See infra note 106 (citing cases denying certification because of the necessity for
individualized proof).
52. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276, 1283 (1984).
53. Id. at 1284.
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agencies permit discretion, allow for subjective determinations of
decisions despite the existence of formal rules, and cannot be fully
controlled by judicial oversight. As a result, they are subject to influence
or capture. This concern is expressed in the mass tort context in worries
about collusion between defendants and class counsel at the expense of the
plaintiff class.54
Both the alienation and capture arguments assume a baseline of
individualized adjudication that privileges participation. 5 Any divergence
from this baseline is viewed as problematic, although the baseline itself
should be at issue because it assumes a world of unlimited resources or a
very small, localized economy.6 Gerald Frug contrasts bureaucracies with
more democratic decision-making that values direct participation. In the
court context, this baseline of direct participation might be embodied in
the jury trial. The jury is, in some ways, the paragon of direct democracy:
Citizens are picked at random to decide the outcome of other citizens'
cases. By contrast, quasi-administrative agencies decide outcomes based
on judicial structuring or a negotiated resolution between the attorneys of
the parties. The fear is that the attorneys will take their own interests into
account at the expense of the true interests of the claimants, or that the
interests of some claimants will be placed above those of others. A classic
example of this latter problem involves future claimants.

54. See, e.g., Alon Harel & Alex Stein, AuctioningforLoyalty: Selection and Monitoringof
Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 69 (2004) (describing facets of the agent principal
problem and proposing a competition-based solution to align the interests of class counsel and the
class); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051
(1996) (describing egregious instances of class counsel taking advantage of absent class members
in class action settlements).
55. Cf.Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873,888-89 (1987) (arguing
that our understanding of rights is based on the natural or desirable functions of government as
understood from common law baselines). Sunstein points out that in administrative law no
constitutional violation will be found in cases of agency inaction based on the common law
baseline, yet the rise of the administrative state represents a rejection of common law ordering. See
id. at 892-93.
56. Cf Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 689, 689 (2004) ("There never was a regime of full trials.").
57. See Frug, supra note 52, at 1386 ("Acting together, we could begin to dismantle the
structure of bureaucratic organizations-not all at once, but piece by piece. In their place we could
substitute forms of human relationship that better reflect our aspirations for human development
and equality."). Frug calls for a democratic, grassroots approach to decision-making and
administration. See id.
58. The treatment of future claimants was one of the main criticisms of the Georgine v.
Amchem Productssettlement that was overturned by the Supreme Court. See Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600, 620 (1997); Susan P. Koniak, FeastingWhile the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1063 (1995) (describing flaws in
the Amchem settlement); see also George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases:
Deterrence, Compensation, and Necessity, 88 VA. L. REv. 1989 (2002) (arguing that protecting
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As compared to the day-in-court ideal, quasi-administrative agencies
in the courts raise concerns beyond the inherent flaws in interest
representation. The claimants' ability to participate in their own cases, to
tell their own stories to their peers, to present themselves to the court, and
to control their role in the litigation and the outcome with respect to their
individual claims is severely limited. The result of this weakening of
participation is a diminution of dignity.59 In comparison to individualized
adjudication, quasi-administrative agencies in the courts do not require
that the judge face individual litigants. A trust or other entity created for
the purpose of administering claims decides individual compensation
based on a matrix or some other routinized form of decision-making. The
place of each individual in the matrix is often determined based on
documents, just as it is in administrative determinations in entities such as
the Social Security Administration.60 The day-in-court ideal requires the
judge to interact directly with the people affected by the judge's decision.
This interaction is absent in the mass torts settlements, and the resulting
alienation of the judge from the claimant may lead to a diminished sense
of decision-maker responsibility. One goal of the rationalization of
decision-making in a bureaucracy is to eradicate the emotional element
from decision-making. 6 The very absence of this element, however,
allows the judge to be more cavalier and less considered in determining
outcomes, and in so doing, abdicate the deliberative role.
The third argument against quasi-administrative agencies in the courts
is the error argument. There are two strands of this argument. The first
contention is that administrative structures are too rough and result in
error, and this rough justice is unacceptable. A second contention is that
the shift from adjudication to administration opens the door to new risks
of fraud as claimants attempt to take advantage of lower burdens of proof.
This argument has both empirical and normative elements. The
future claimants by excluding them from settlements may leave them worse off).
59. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Action, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1198
(1982) ("Respect for individual dignity, autonomy, and self-expression demands that those with
rights directly at risk have an adequate means of registering their concerns."); see also Tom R.
Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 133-44 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992) (describing findings that
perceived fairness of process is critical to perception of legitimacy of outcomes).
60. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336-37 (1976) (upholding termination of
social security disability benefits on the basis of review of submitted written evidence only).
61. See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 216 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills,
trans., 1968) ("[T]he more the bureaucracy is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in
eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional
elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as
its special virtue."). Frug insightfully argues that subjectivity and objectivity in decision-making
are incompatible but simultaneously present in arguments regarding administration, which seek
both to ensure individual expression and apply uniform rules. See Frug, supranote 52, at 1289-91.
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empirical claim is that the mechanisms used in administering claims in
court bureaucracies lead to too many errors in compensation. But how
many errors are too many? The battles over errors and allegations of fraud
in the Diet Drugs litigation described in Part Ill of this Article illuminate
this incompetence objection. In that case, the error rate required substantial
court intervention, and critics argued that the settlement was essentially
imploding as a result.62
There are several ways in which rough justice can lead to errors.
Collective litigation seeks to maximize efficiency by finding the likenesses
in claims and treating them the same across the board. The process of line
drawing may result in overinclusion or underinclusion of claimants. Some
claimants who do not deserve compensation may be included either
because their claims are fraudulent or because the criteria for
compensation simply do not reflect the realities of the litigation landscape.
For example, in the Diet Drugs litigation, defendants accused some
claimants' attorneys of falsifying echocardiogram results to obtain
undeserved compensation for their clients.63 Other claimants who deserve
compensation may be awarded less than they would at trial or may not be
included at all, either because of the one-size-fits-all criteria for
compensation that does not fit the specific case or other factors such as
inadequate notice. Furthermore, the process of categorization, inherent in
claims administration procedures, may treat different claimants alike,
either treating different injuries similarly or treating differently situated
claimants similarly. Finally, the availability of a simple, speedy, and
inexpensive process will increase the numbers of claimants, increasing the
risk of error by taxing the system, decreasing the amount available to all
claimants, or both.
Of the possible responses to these arguments, two stand out. First, both
arguments depend on a baseline of the day-in-court ideal. This is an
idealized view of litigation and democracy not suited to the second-best
world in which we actually live. There are plenty of counter-examples that
illustrate that the individualized day in court is just an ideal, neither a
historical nor contemporary description of how courts in fact operate.'M As
Stephen Yeazell showed in his study of the history of the class action and
Robert Bone demonstrated in his exploration of the idea of representation,

62. See generallyAlison Frankel, Still Ticking: Mistaken Assumptions, Greedy Lawyers, and
Suggestions of FraudHave Made Fen-Phen a Disasterofa Mass Tort, AM. LAW., Mar. 2005, at
92, 92-94 (describing the litigation as a "series of mistakes" and a guide for how not to handle mass
tort cases).
63. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs ll), 226 F.R.D. 498, 510 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
64. See Friedman, supra note 56, at 697 (describing trials as historically a "residual
category... reserved for the unusual, the extraordinary").
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the individualized trial of a single plaintiff is not the only way our court
system has operated.65
Our system has always accommodated group resolution of claims, and
since the Industrial Revolution, has developed structures for mass claims
resolution to fit modem society. For example, the increase of industrial
accidents in the late nineteenth century gave rise to company-created
workmen's compensation schemes with formal, administrative guidelines
for dealing with workplace injuries." Later, in the era of automobile
accidents, insurance claims adjusters shaped the "settlement market" for
automobile torts, creating internal, formal, systematic rules for dealing
with various types of claims.67 Private companies were not the exclusive
source of aggregation and systematization in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. On the plaintiffs' attorney side, lawyers created
economies of scale as early as the 1890s by aggregating clients with
similar types of claims, such as injuries at a particular workplace, types of
property loss or mass accident.68 Accordingly, there is a long and
continuous history of management of large numbers of claims through
various types of private ordering, mostly in the shadow of the court
system.
Even within the court system, the day in court is not ideal. The current
adjudication system has taken more and more power away from the jury,
both through various procedural mechanisms-such as judgment as a
matter of law 69 -and by encouraging settlements.7" The day-in-court ideal

65. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing group litigation back eight centuries); Bone, supra note
8 (reviewing the long history of virtual representation).
66. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: PersonallnjuryLaw in the Late 19th Century,
12 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 351, 361 (1987); Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The
Inevitability ofAggregate Settlement: An InstitutionalAccount ofAmerican Tort Law, 57 VAND.
L. REv. 1571, 1585-87 (2004) (citing PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE
TO THE WELFARE STATE (2000)).
67. See H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE

CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 18 (Sheldon Messinger & Howard S. Becker eds., 1970) (stating that the
"key figure in the settlement of automobile bodily injury claims is the adjuster"); Issacharoff &

Witt, supra note 66, at 1603-08.
68. See Issacharoff& Witt, supranote 66, at 1596-98 (describing the law practices ofSamuel

Evans Maires of Pennsylvania, who specialized in claims against the Philadelphia Traction
Company in the 1890s, Arthur E. Clark of New York, who "developed a portfolio of more than
2,000 claims by property owners against New York telephone and telegraph companies in the late
1890s," and a single Wisconsin law firm that "signed up a large number of property damage
claimants" after a dam break in 1911).

69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), (b) (establishing the standard for judgment as a matter of law
during or after trial).
70. See Judith Resnik, Procedureas Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2005)

(describing judicial preference for settlement).
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has been accepted as a subjective, inconsistent process reflecting wide
disparities in the quality of lawyers, the predilection and temperament of
judges, and the dynamics of juries. Trials-the sine qua non of an
individualized process-are becoming a rare and expensive commodity
that fewer litigants experience or can afford. 7' Instead, claims are resolved
by motion, through settlements, or privately through arbitration or other
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.72 Structural differences among
litigants can skew results so that institutions are more likely to obtain
redress than individual litigants. 73 Results of the individualized court
system famously lack uniformity, so that a litigant with one lawyer before
one jury may obtain a verdict that is many multiples greater than another
similarly situated litigant before another jury. The same is true of
settlements. A litigant with a lawyer who is a particularly good negotiator,
who is a repeat player, or who otherwise has an edge in negotiation will
obtain a better settlement. Finally, individual litigation results in firstcome, first-served justice where limited funds available for recovery may
not be allocated with any reference to the larger goals of distributive
justice.
This does not mean that we should reject the value of the day in court
altogether, but rather that we must recognize our historical acceptance of
its real world limitations when considering this value as a basis for
limiting court-created bureaucracies. Proponents of the day-in-court ideal
may argue, however, that these examples are the exception that proves the
rule and require us to cling ever harder to the individual trial that has
characterized the courts in the public imagination and that serves as a

71. See Galanter, supra note 17, at 516-17, 567.
72. See Erichson, supra note 37 (describing the types of aggregate settlements); Deborah R.
Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and OtherLarge Scale
Litigation, 11 DUKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 189 (2001) ("[L]awyers who are settling large
numbers of claims at a time are usually attracted to quasi-administrative schemes that do not require
significant time or resources to determine damage payments."); Francis E. McGovern, The
Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 61 (discussing
claims resolution facilities and the mass settlement of mass torts); Resnik, Migrating,supra note
21, at 784-85 (arguing that the decline in the number of trials is in part due to adjudicatory activity
occurring elsewhere).
73. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 97-104 (1974) (analyzing the "different kinds of parties
and the effect these differences might have on the way the system works"); cf.Gillian K. Hadfield,
ExploringEconomic andDemocraticTheories of CivilLitigation:DifferencesBetween Individual
and OrganizationalLitigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275,
1280-81 (2005) (presenting empirical data showing that institutional plaintiffs are more likely to
settle cases, whereas individual plaintiffs are more likely to have their cases adjudicated by a trial).
But see Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25: Reflections on Galanter's "Haves" Article and Work
It HasInspired, 33 LAW & Soc'y REv. 1099 (1999) (arguing that there is little empirical evidence
proving Galanter's thesis).
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counterpoint to both the generalized policy-making role of the legislature
and the bureaucratization of the administrative state. Nevertheless, while
this distrust of bureaucracy is valid, so too should we consider whether to
develop a healthy distrust of the individualized process, especially when
it leads to inequitable outcomes.
A second, related response is that the scarcity of the day in court
sacrifices other values. For example, insistence on an individualized
process means a decrease in access to justice for litigants. The dignity
value fostered by direct participation in litigation is lost if the courthouse
doors are closed to litigants or recovery is not available because a limited
fund has been used up by those who got there first.74 While there will be
some complex cases where individual adjudication is feasible, we must
nevertheless be wary of the extent to which an insistence on perfection in
the process results in the denial of a remedy, rendering participation
illusory.75 There was a time when the response to this argument could have
been that another forum remains open to litigants: state courts of general
jurisdiction. Various new jurisdictional statutes along with rulings from
the federal courts consolidating their ability to have final say over the
centralization of claims have reduced the availability of this forum.7 6 In the
case of national class actions, for example, one court has held that if the
federal forum has heard the certification motion and denied it, the same
class action cannot be re-certified in state court.77
Normative conclusions about a tolerable error rate should depend on
the answers to some empirical questions, such as whether judicially
administered claims actually result in more error than individualized
adjudication, just as conclusions about participation values should be
based on the actual level of participation offered under the current regime.
But the answer to these questions also depends on a fundamental tradeoff
between liberty and equality. In the end the question must be what limits

74. This is the basis for the limited fund class action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
75. For example, in the Diet Drugs settlement described below, claimants with the most
severe damage, primary pulmonary hypertension, were excluded from the settlement with the
assumption that they would bring or settle their claims individually, or both. See infra text
accompanying notes 154-58.
76. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing legislation expanding federal
jurisdiction over mass claims).
77. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th
Cir. 2003) (holding that unnamed class members are bound by court's denial of certification motion
in national products liability class action and are barred from filing national class action with
respect to same claims in another forum); cf Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518,
524-25 (1986) ("[Ilnefficient simultaneous litigation in state and federal courts on the same
issue.... is one of the costs of our dual court system .... "). But see Bailey v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 414 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding the district court's refusal to grant
an anti-suit injunction based on comity concerns because of the extent to which the case had
already been litigated in state court).
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are we willing to tolerate in order to increase access to justice for cases
that would otherwise remain unheard?
C. History Repeating Itself-Roots of the EnduringArguments
Against Administrative Justice
The fight over the competence of the federal courts to oversee quasiadministrative agencies is a reenactment of the early twentieth century
battle over the ability of the legislature to delegate tasks to administrative
agencies. It is worthwhile to look briefly at the development of the
administrative state in the United States to see the origins of these
arguments and the similarity between the two debates. While the same
fundamental concerns apply in all cases of bureaucratization, the
competency issues are not substantially different in the instance of court
creation of quasi-administrative agencies as compared with legislative
creation of genuine administrative agencies. A major reason that the
country ultimately made peace with administrative agencies is the reliance
on federal courts to oversee and review administrative actions. There is no
reason why, as a historical and functional matter, the federal courts are not
equally well-suited to oversee quasi-administrative agencies.
Historically, American courts were considered an individualistic
counterpoint to political parties.7 8 As an institution, courts were
particularly responsive to concerns about capture in the political arena.79
The United States of the nineteenth century was an anomaly from the
European perspective because it lacked an "'insulated bureaucratic
class."' 8 ° In the absence of a strong centralized state, the American system
was characterized by a decentralized party system of government where
administrative positions were political appointments, controlled and doled
out by parties until the late nineteenth century. 81 The courts were an
individualistic institution in tension with the political parties and were the
only governmental institution outside direct party control.82 Thus Alexis
de Tocqueville's famous observation of 1830s America that "[t]here is
78. See

STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF

NATURAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 26-27 (1982).

79. See id. at 28-29.
80. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 222

(1992) (quoting SKOWRONEK, supra note 78, at 6).
81. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 78, at 48; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF
AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982) (describing the factors that transformed the "mid-

century party system" into a bureaucratic system).
82. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 78, at 26-29. As Skowronek describes the interaction:
"Judicial activism was a natural complement to an electoral-representative system that had a natural
impulse to distribute benefits widely through a logrolling politics (like the politics of granting
special corporate charters) and to avoid, so far as possible, bold declarations of winners and losers
in legislation." Id. at 29.
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hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or
later turn into a judicial one."83 Early forays into bureaucratization, which
began under President Jackson, were a reaction to the system of courts and
parties, and responsive to concerns of capture of the parties by interests
that did not reflect the public good.84
While the concerns of the nineteenth century centered on parties, "in
the twentieth century the issue of legitimacy has centered on the authority
of administrators and bureaucrats." 5 The rise of administrative regulation
in the twentieth century not only "represented a renewed threat to common
law conceptions of legality" but also "revived older fears of redistribution,
statism, and centralization that had previously been directed at legislative
action., 8 6 Morton Horwitz has observed that "[m]uch of the struggle over
administrative justice during the past century has derived from [the]
challenge posed by the rise of administration to nineteenth-century
conceptions of individually oriented justice."87 As Jerry Mashaw has
explained, "[Iln a legal culture largely oriented toward court enforcement
of individual legal rights, 'administration' has always seemed as
antithetical to 'law' as 'bureaucracy' is to 'justice."'8 8 Before the New
Deal, the reaction of judges to state regulation was the creation of
procedural and substantive limits on increases in federal administrative
regulation, for example, through the non-delegation of power doctrine.89
These are the same fears expressed about the rise of administrative
structures in the court system. Today, federal judges are creating
procedural limitations on the possibility of building quasi-administrative
agencies within the court system to administer claims in much the same
way.
Legislative enactments soon became too broad to create limits on
administrative power and the non-delegation doctrine came to be viewed
as "too crude and formalistic to serve the function of limiting
administrative discretion."9 As critics began to see that administrative

83. ALEXIS DE TOCQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J. P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
84. See generally MArTEw A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF
BUREAUCRACY INJACKSONIAN AMERICA (1975) (describing the development of early bureaucracy

and administration under Jackson); Schwartz, supra note 46, at 827 (arguing that under President
Jackson "bureaucracy was intended to impose restraint and a sense of propriety on a people that
had lost its confidence that these qualities were either innate or nurtured by traditional
institutions").
85. HORWITZ, supra note 80, at 222.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE I (1983).
89. See HORWITZ, supra note 80, at 222-23.
90. Id. at 223.
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rules left open opportunities for discretion and that this discretion
permitted subjective decision-making that again was subject to influence
and self-interest, new legitimating theories for bureaucratic structures
became necessary.9' Thus in the beginning of the twentieth century and
during the rise of the administrative state as we know it, legal scholars
recognized the failure of rules to contain judicial discretion as well as
administrative authority, and instead, scholars turned to ideas of
expertise-to faith in science and objectivity-as a check on
administrative power.92
These same historical struggles play out today in the realm of class
actions and other aggregative litigation. Courts increasingly rely on
expertise to legitimate quasi-administrative systems through the use of
special masters and expert judges. Although ordinarily judges are
generalists who can decide any case, certain complex cases are an
exception. Cases have migrated to particular judges who are considered
adept at handling these cases because of their prior experience. The MultiDistrict Litigation panel picks certain experienced judges to whom it
assigns complex aggregations.93 The increasing use of magistrates on the
federal level has also been much discussed in the literature.94 Judges assign
individuals with expertise in mass tort administration to serve as special
masters in large cases.95 On the state level, some states have a complex
litigation docket presided over by judges with particular expertise in class
actions or other complex litigation.
But soon proponents of administration realized that experts' opinions
were subjective, liable to capture and incompetence. Market solutions to
the problem posed by the dangers of discretion followed the realization of
expert subjectivity.97 In this model, "the policing function is performed not

91. See Frug, supra note 52, at 1297-1317.
92. See id.at 1331-33; HORWITZ, supra note 80, at 223-24. For a brilliant treatment of the
effect of the objectivity problem on democratic thought, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973).

93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
94. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (discussing
and critiquing increased use of magistrates); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE INMASS
TORT LITIGATION 143-45 (1995) (describing and defending the role of specialized special masters
in mass tort litigation).
95. See generallyGeorgene Vairo, Why Me? TheRole ofPrivateTrustees in Complex Claims
Resolution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1391 (2005) (discussing the appointment of special masters in
complex litigation).
96. For example, Connecticut has a complex litigation docket. See Mitchell L. Bach & Lee
Applebaum, A History of the Creation andJurisprudenceof Business Courts in the Last Decade,
60 Bus. LAW. 147, 211-13 (2004). Approximately 45% of the cases on this docket are nonvehicular torts. See id. at 213.
97. See Frug, supra note 52, at 1355-56 (describing the "market/pluralist" model for
controlling governmental bureaucratic discretion).
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through judicial surveillance but through the interjection of another form
of social organization into the operation of the bureaucracy." 98 The market
discipline model creates incentives for the bureaucrats to be faithful to the
interest of constituents by threatening their removal from their positions. 99
The pluralist version of this model solves the problem of capture by
representing interest groups within the bureaucracy."
Relying on the market model, class action scholars have argued in
favor of auctions for class counsel, 01 various fee structures such as
percentage-based fees," : or presumptive removal of class counsel in the
event a settlement is not approved,0 3 to create incentives for class counsel
to faithfully represent the class. In the pluralist vein, scholars have
proposed the representation of sub-classes by separate attorneys' °4 and the
intervention of objectors or even appointment of objectors to represent
various interests. 0 5 Courts sometimes deny class action certification on the
theory that the litigation concerns an "immature tort" that needs to be fully
litigated in a series of individual cases before being addressed collectively.
In doing so they are relying on a similar kind of market in adjudication to
determine the common issues and value of the individual claim."° This

98. Id. at 1356.
99. See id. at 1359.
100. See id. at 1359-60 ("The bureaucracy's decisions will then reflect its constituents' wishes
because the same process-interest-group conflict-will occur both inside and outside the
bureaucracy.").
101. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class
Action andDerivativeLitigation:EconomicAnalysisandRecommendationsforReform, 58 U. CHR.
L. REV. 1, 105-16 (1991) (describing proposals for auctioning off claims and for auctioning rights
to represent the class). But see Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluatingthe Selection
of Class Counsel byAuction, 102 CoLuM. L. REv. 650,652 (2002) (arguing that auctions are poor
tools for selecting firms based on multiple criteria, that auctions compromise the judicial role, and
that they are unlikely to produce reasonable fee awards as an empirical matter and proposing
stronger lead plaintiffs as an alternative solution to the agent-principal problem).
102. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing
Fairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 889-90 (1987). In the
most complex litigation, the attorneys' fees constitute a marginally increased percentage of the fund
to encourage the maximization of claimholder value. See id.
103. See Richard A. Nagareda, AdministeringAdequacy in Class Representation,82 TEX. L.
REv. 287, 293 (2003).
104. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 59 (advocating a pluralist model of class action effectuated
through sub-classification).
105. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors:ExtortionistFreeRiders or Fairness
Guarantors,2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403 (evaluating the effect of objectors upon class action
litigation).
106. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying class
certification because individual trials would result in a more accurate definition of what individual
issues predominate); Jacobs v. Osmose, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 607, 618 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (denying
certification because there was not a sufficient "track record" of trials for a predominance
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reasoning can be pushed to the extreme. Opinions such as Judge Posner's
influential In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.' °7 decision, denying
certification of a medical products liability class action, rely on the idea
that the courts should not try big cases that would interfere with the
maturing litigation process or be devastating to the industry in question
either because the source of the devastation should not be the courts or
because the industry should be protected despite wrongdoing." 8
These types of pluralist solutions encourage the filing of more cases
and increase the necessity of centralization and bureaucratization.
Likewise, bureaucracy creates the foundation of its own existence by
permitting rationalization of claims. The implementation of a system to
administer claims and increase access to the courts encourages an influx
of claims which then need to be resolved through an increase in
administrative capacity, opening the door to even more cases. 9 Judges
have responded by idealizing the individualized hearing, even as it is
increasingly replaced by other ways of resolving cases.

determination). See generally Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69
B.U. L. REv. 659 (1989) (describing mature mass torts as those where "there has been full and
complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions").
That a market in adjudication will lead to expected valuation of claims is the theory behind the
"maturation" of a mass tort. See id.
107. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
108. See id.at 1298. In Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner explained:
Consider the situation that would obtain if the class had not been certified. The
defendants would be facing 300 suits....
...But the defendants have won twelve of the first thirteen, and, if this is a
representative sample, they are likely to win most of the remaining ones as well.
Perhaps in the end, if class-action treatment is denied (it has been denied in all the
other hemophiliac HIV suits in which class certification has been sought), they
will be compelled to pay damages in only 25 cases, involving a potential liability
of perhaps no more than $125 million altogether. These are guesses, of course, but
they are at once conservative and usable for the limited purpose of comparing the
situation that will face the defendants if the class certification stands. All of a
sudden they will face thousands of plaintiffs.
Id.
109. As some scholars have argued, the Federalists' theory in fact created a "self-fulfilling
prophecy: The institutions erected to counterbalance factions and regulate human selfishness were
also intentionally designed to multiply factions and to encourage selfishness." Schwartz, supranote
46, at 832. Similarly, bureaucracy itself is the cause as well as the consequence of an alienated
society. See id. at 833. Lack of participation breeds alienation, which results in disengagement,
spurring reliance on forms of ordering that do not require participation.
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Ill. THE CREATION OF QUASI-ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
IN THE COURTS

This Part explains how masses of claims arrive in the courts and one
common method of dealing with them: settlement and the subsequent
creation of a claims administration facility. The Diet Drugs litigation"
provides an eye-opening illustration of the methods by which courts
participate in the creation of quasi-administrative agencies inside and in
the shadow of the court system.'"
Our society prevents and redresses mass production harms in three
ways: direct government regulation through administrative agencies;
individual causes of action such as tort claims or civil rights legislation;
and mechanisms for aggregating claims, including class actions and multidistrict litigation. Administrative agencies directly regulate and police
institutional conduct. Individual causes of action allow individuals to sue
institutions for misconduct and collect damages or obtain injunctive relief,
thereby stopping the misconduct, punishing the perpetrator, deterring
future misconduct, or all of the above. Aggregative litigation and class
actions allow individuals to obtain access to justice collectively. All of
these devices may be used to address a single mass production wrong.
First, some kind of regulatory failure leads to an influx of large numbers
of individual claims, setting the stage for aggregation or class treatment.
Second, various forms of informal ordering and formal procedural
mechanisms result in the creation of a temporary administrative agency to
administer compensation to claimants. Finally, claims are administered
outside the court system.
The Diet Drugs litigation arose out of regulatory failure. The Food and
Drug Administration, which probably should never have approved the
drugs in question, issued a warning about the drugs after receiving
substantial reports of health risks associated with them."1 2 The
manufacturer, American Home Products (AHP), voluntarily took these
drugs off the market." 3 Individual plaintiffs brought suits in state" 4 and
110. See generally Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.)
(In re Diet Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (mem.)
(certifying the class and approving the settlement for individuals seeking to recover for injuries
sustained as a result of using diet drugs); MUNDY, supra note 2 (relaying the story of the mass
settlement for individuals harmed by taking Fen-Phen).
111. See generallyRobert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing the impact of the legal system on
the bargaining process that occurs outside of the court room).
112. SeeIn re Diet Drugs I, 2000 WL 1222042, at *2.
113. See id. The FDA also has the power to require a company to remove drugs from the
market, but did not do so. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, A Texas Jury Rules Against a DietDrug,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at C1. Prominent state court suits arising out of the marketing of Fen-
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federal courts. Suits that were brought in federal court or were removed to
federal court were consolidated in a Multi-District Litigation proceeding
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania." 5 Simultaneously, several class
actions were brought in state and federal courts.116 The aggregated claims
either settled in groups or as part of a settlement-only class action.
This litigation provides a window into the complexities of court
bureaucracies and the trade-offs that lawyers, judges, plaintiffs, and
defendants must make. It illustrates the two main procedural mechanisms
for administration of claims in the court system-informal aggregation and
class actions-as well as some of the reasons why we might be distrustful
of them. The administrative agency created in the Diet Drugs litigation,
the AHP Trust, was somewhat transparent and public because the parties'
perpetual fighting returned them to the court on multiple occasions. In
retrospect, this transparency usefully reveals the difficult tradeoffs and
complexity of administrative claims resolution.
A. How Mass Torts Happen: A Case Study of the
Diet Drugs Litigation
The diet drugs at issue in the thousands of cases that flooded the federal
courts were Redux and Pondimin, one half of the drug combination that
was commonly referred to as Fen-Phen and prescribed for weight loss." 7
The drug's record for effectiveness was minimal," 8 but its effects on the
health of its users were significant. In the worst cases, it caused primary
pulmonary hypertension leading to a terrible death, and in other cases, it
caused heart valve defects after only a short period of use." 9 The drugs
were manufactured by AHP and widely sold in the United States in the
mid-i 990s. Before the drugs were marketed, there was evidence that they
could cause valvular heart damage.' Between June 1996, when the drugs
began to be sold, and September 1997, when they were taken off the
market, an estimated two million people took the drugs. 2 '

Phen resulted in multi-million dollar verdicts and settlements. See, e.g., id. (describing $1 billion
jury verdict in Texas).
115. See In re Diet Drugs I, 2000 WL 1222042, at *3. The 18,000 suits alleging heart
problems arising out of the use of Fen-Phen were consolidated under MDL Docket No. 1203 in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at *7.
118. See MUNDY, supra note 2, at 155. The drugs were found to cause only a three percent
increase in weight loss over a sugar pill. See id.
119. See In re Diet Drugs 1, 2000 WL 1222042, at *14 (stating that significant risk was

produced after three to six months of drug use).
120. See id. at *2.
121. See id. at *1.
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At the time, and it appears to this day, the FDA saw the pharmaceutical
companies-rather than the patients likely to take these drugs or the
public-as its "client." Various drugs, including Redux, were pushed
through the approvals process during this period and subsequently caused
numerous deaths.'22 In the 1990s, companies succeeded in expediting their
drugs through the FDA approval process as a result of that agency's
increased emphasis on cooperation with the private sector. 123 President
should see pharmaceutical companies as
Clinton told the agency that they
"partners, not adversaries., 12 ' As one former FDA legislative affairs
staffer, Kathleen Holcombe, asserted "there has been a huge
shift ....[the] FDA, historically, had an approach of, 'Regulate, be tough,

wrong.., the FDA [now] sees
enforce the law [and] don't let one thing go
125
itself much more in a cooperative role.'

In the rush to approve drugs, the FDA opened the floodgates to tens of
thousands of lawsuits. One former member of an FDA advisory committee
observed that "[u]nfortunately the public pays for this, because the public
believes that the FDA is watching the door, that they are the sentry.' 26
The practice of expediting drugs that required more careful review resulted
in seven drugs that had been prematurely or inappropriately approved
being taken off the market between 1993 and 2000, a significant increase
in such recalls. 2 7 Among them was Redux. The FDA effectively shifted
responsibility to doctors and patients, and in so doing shifted risk
regulation to the tort system. In the absence of direct governmental
regulation, the tort system was called in to regulate risk, compensate
patients, and deter misconduct. That is what happened in the Diet Drugs
litigation.
Redux was approved by the FDA under suspicious circumstances and
despite evidence that it had "low effectiveness and very high risk for
122. In an investigative report, the L.A. Times found seven drugs that were approved by the
FDA in this period and posed risk to human life that far outweighed any potential benefit. See
Willman, supra note 1,at Al. These included a gastric reflux drug that was administered to
children and caused at least eight infant deaths and a total of 302 deaths of infants and adults; a flu
remedy that was supposed to reduce flu symptoms by one day and is related to twenty-two deaths;
an irritable bowel remedy that was only effective in 10% to 20% of the cases but caused severe
colon problems in patients resulting in at least five deaths and significant surgeries in patients; an
antibiotic that was duplicative of other antibiotics on the market and is linked to thirteen deaths;
a diabetes drug that caused liver failure and 391 deaths but remained on the U.S. market even after
it had been removed from the market in Britain; and Redux, the weight loss drug described here.
See id.
123. See id.(indicating that the "demand for AIDS drugs changed the political climate").
124. Id.Increasingly, government operates in this way. See MARTHAMINoW, PARTNERS, NOT
RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3 (2002).
125. Wiliman, supranote 1, at Al.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 122.
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neurotoxicity and pulmonary hypertension."' 28 The director of the FDA's
endocrine and metabolic drugs division refused to sign the agency's
formal letter of approval because of his concerns over the drug, but it was
nevertheless approved in 1996 without any significant warning labels. 2 9
An email that was at once prescient and offensive captures the company's
attitude during this period and is part of the reason they were forced to
settle: "Can I look forward to my waning years signing checks for fat
people who are a little afraid of some silly lung problem... ?,,130 Financial
analysts estimated the drug would gross $1.8 billion within four years.
Instead, within two years it was withdrawn from the market.'3 ' After
Redux had been sold to millions of consumers, doctors at the Mayo Clinic
in Minnesota observed a high incidence of significant heart valve problems
that appeared to be caused by these diet drugs even where they had been
prescribed for only a short period of time. The doctors published their
32
findings via press release and in the New England Journal of Medicine.
Their findings were subsequently confirmed by three epidemiological
studies. 33 In September of 1997, AHP recalled the drug under pressure
from the FDA.'4 By that time, numerous
lawsuits, including a class action,
'
had been filed against the company.35
The lack of rigorous oversight by the FDA substantially contributed to
this flood of claims. In July 1999, the FDA wrote a letter to the plaintiffs'
lawyers on the MDL Panel managing the Fen-Phen litigation stating that
the FDA did not have critical information regarding the dangers of the
drug at issue before the drug was approved.' 36 Later that fall, allegedly
under pressure from lawyers for the pharmaceutical company, the FDA
retracted its July letter and issued a statement that it had had all the
relevant information by May 1999-two years after the drug had been
recalled. 37 This softening of language was more favorable to the drug
128. Willman, supra note 1, at Al (quoting Dr. Leo Lutwak, a former Cornell University
professor and scientist at the FDA).
129. See id.(stating that when the director, Dr. Solomon Sobel, refused to sign the approval
letter, an FDA administrator, Dr. James Bilstad, signed it instead).
130. MUNDY, supranote 2, at 9 (quoting an email from Kay Anderson, Administrator, to Patty
Acri, Product Labeling Director, Wyeth-Ayerst (Oct. 3, 1996) (emphasis omitted).
131. See Willman, supranote 1, at Al.
132. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (mem.).
133. See id.These confirming studies were published in 1998.
134. See MUNDY, supranote 2, at 108.
135. See id. at 23. For example, the first wrongful death suit relating to Fen-Phen was filed on
May 5, 1997. See id.
136. See id.at 246. The letter from the FDA's Enforcement Office director stated that "the
FDA has determined to the best of its knowledge, at the time of the article's publication [May
1999], the information alleged in your letter was not in the possession of the agency." Id.
137. See id.at 376.
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companies than the initial statement because the FDA did not directly
admit that it had not been given this important information before the drug
was approved. Regulators relied on the tort system to justify this retreat.
When confronted with the retraction, the individual in charge of drug
reviews at the agency allegedly said: "' Surely a smart plaintiffs['] attorney
will see what we've done here.' He added that it was up to the lawyers
'
suing the companies to get their information and bring it out in court." 138
There was no successful government investigation of the diet drugs prior
to their release, of the conduct of the FDA officials, or of the
pharmaceutical company after the manufacturer voluntarily recalled the
drugs. According to these government officials, the court system should
enforce the drug manufacturer's product safety obligations, rather than the
regulatory agency.
B. ProceduralMechanismsfor Administration in the Courts:
ClassActions and Multi-DistrictLitigation
The Diet Drugs litigation is a good example of the need for claims
administration because the harms these drugs caused presented the courts
with a massive number of cases to resolve. The federal courts used all the
collectivization procedures available to them, including private ordering,
aggregation, and class actions. About 18,000 individual lawsuits were filed
against AHP.' 3 9 Those individual cases brought into the federal court
system were transferred by an MDL Panel to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for consolidated pretrial proceedings. 4 ° These cases were
overseen by a Plaintiffs' Management Committee (PMC), acting on behalf
of all plaintiffs. 4 ' The PMC conducted significant discovery, some of
which was repeated by state court litigants.'42 Simultaneously, multiple
class actions were filed in both state and federal courts seeking various
personal injury damages, refunds for the cost of the drugs, and medical
monitoring. 143 The medical monitoring classes were certified in individual
states and nationally.'"

138. Id.
139. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (mem.).
140. See id.
These were consolidated under MDL Docket No. 1203. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
at *34.
143. See id.
at *3.Among these was Vadino v. American Home ProductsCorp., a New Jersey
class action for medical monitoring and damages for unfair and deceptive trade practices. See id.
144. See id.
(describing a national medical monitoring class action certified in MDL court, and
medical monitoring class actions certified in West Virginia, Illinois, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss2/2

28

Lahav: The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex Lit

THE LA WAND LARGE NUMBERS

Though product liability cases such as these would seem like the proper
subject for state courts of general jurisdiction, in most cases defendants
were able to remove to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,
thereby permitting the cases to be aggregated under the Multi-District
Litigation Act.'n In 1968, shortly after the acceptance of the revised class
actions rule, Congress passed the MDL statute that permits consolidation
of cases from multiple districts when they involve common questions of
fact. " The statute was passed in reaction to the inefficiencies caused by
decentralized identical litigation in multiple forums and on the heels of an
innovative judicial procedure instituted in order to deal with a flood of
antitrust suits alleging price fixing of electrical equipment.147 In 1959, the
federal government brought criminal antitrust proceedings against
electrical equipment manufacturers, which led to indictments against
twenty-nine manufacturers and forty-four individuals. 4 ' In the aftermath
of the criminal proceedings, more than 1,880 civil suits were filed in
thirty-five federal districts. 149 Chief Justice Warren, concerned that the
large numbers of electric equipment cases would overburden the federal
courts, appointed a nine-member Coordinating Committee for Multiple
Litigation to deal with pretrial issues in these cases.50 Accordingly, at its
inception MDL was a procedural innovation to encourage bureaucratic
rationalization of a court system overburdened by an influx of claims.
This innovative procedure to address an influx of cases was the
prototype of the MDL statute and spurred the creation of a complex,
centralized court bureaucracy. Discovery was addressed on a national
scale: pretrial orders were agreed upon by the judges of the thirty-five
districts, though they retained jurisdiction and could alter the orders if so
inclined; uniform interrogatories were overseen by the Committee; a
central document repository was created; and a national deposition
program was instituted."'5 Trials were held in the individual district courts,
but coordinated by the Committee so that groups of cases of various
individual product lines would be tried at once.' 52 Today litigation
constituting 2,000 individual claims would be a proverbial drop in the
bucket. Could the Chief Justice have imagined that innovative court
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
146. See Act ofApr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296,82 Stat. 109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
147. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 60 (1964) (utilizing a
"program of national discovery" to serve plaintiffs twenty-three interrogatories).
148. See Arthur F. Staubitz, Release of Grand Jury Minutes in the National Deposition
Programof the ElectricalEquipment Cases, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1133, 1133 (1964).
149. See Paul C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The ElectricalEquipmentAntitrust Cases: Novel
JudicialAdministration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621, 622 (1964).
150. See id. at 623.
151. See id. at 623-27.
152. See id. at 627.
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administration procedures would soon be needed for ten times this
number?
There were two types of class action cases arising out of the diet drugs
debacle. First, class actions were filed seeking medical monitoring,
separate from the MDL proceedings. Second, the PMC and defendants
negotiated a settlement of the Diet Drugs cases that was filed, and
subsequently approved, as a settlement-only class action. By 1999,
individual, non-consolidated cases against AHP in state court began to go
to trial and resulted in large jury verdicts.'53 In late April 1999, AHP,
seeking global resolution of this massive litigation, started negotiations
with various plaintiffs' lawyers for state class actions and the PMC which
lasted four months. 154 Some attorneys negotiated lump sum aggregative
settlements, whereas others negotiated the class action settlement. 55
Ultimately, the parties agreed on a nationwide class action settlement in
November 1999.156 A settlement-only class action was submitted to the
court and approved along with the agreement.' 57 This agreement, which
was subject to numerous amendments, was approved in 2000 after a
fairness hearing.15 The settlement did not include claimants with primary
pulmonary hypertension, the most lethal effect of the drugs. These
claimants were expected to bring individual claims because of the severity
of their injuries.'59
When courts oversee class actions, they step into a role that looks more
regulatory than judicial. 60 The two main substantive areas where courts
step into an obviously regulatory role and create complex quasiadministrative agencies are civil rights injunctions and mass torts. Mass
tort class actions, which the 1966 Rules Committee informally rejected,
were more controversial from the beginning. 16' Nevertheless, federal and

153. See American Home Settles Fen-Phen Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999, at C20
(describing jury verdict for $23 million in Fen-Phen suit in Texas and subsequent settlement for
amount far lower due to punitive damages restrictions).
154. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (mem.).
155. See Erichson, supra note 37, at 70.
156. See In re Diet Drugs 1, 2000 WL 1222042, at *5.
157. See id. at *1.
158. See id. at *5.
159. See id. at *31.
160. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 9, at 125-28 (describing two prevalent models of
adjudication, the arbitration and regulation models, and arguing that these models present a division
of labor rather than merely a tension between opposing views of the role of the courts).
161. See Resnik, supra note 29, at 9-11. Resnik describes a written exchange between
Benjamin Kaplan, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and John Frank
regarding mass tort class actions in which Kaplan reassured Frank that"he too was 'anxious to keep
[mass accidents] out."' Id. at 10. Subsequently, the Committee decided not to exclude mass torts
per se within the rule, but believed that the structure of Rule 23(b)(3) would serve to keep mass
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state courts certified such class actions and oversaw settlements of them.
Regulatory agencies have come to rely on the tort suits. But the court's
quasi-administrative role is not limited to these obvious types of cases.
Even in the more accepted consumer cases, administration and, at least
formally, court oversight over the disbursement of funds is required.'62 The
need to administer large numbers of claims lies at the heart of the class
action device.
C. The Structure of Settlement and Its Aftermath
The quasi-administrative agency created as a result of the Diet Drugs
settlement was privately created, subject to court approval, and then
privately administered) 63 It is one particularly complex and relatively
individualized model of an administrative technique for resolving a mass
tort.1 The terms of the settlement initially provided a trust fund (the
"AHP Trust") of three and a half billion dollars in medical monitoring
services and cash payments. 165 For those claimants who had experienced
a certain level of injury, compensation was determined based on a matrix
agreed upon by the parties. 166 The age of the claimant, duration of
exposure to the drug, and severity of the symptoms intersect to form a cell
67
in the matrix determining the individual claimant's compensation.
Matrix-level compensation ranged from $7,389 to $1.485 million. 68 An

torts out. See id. at 11.
162. See FED. R. Cwv. P. 23(e)(l)(C) ("The court may approve a settlement, voluntary
dismissal, or compromise that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding that
the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate.").
163. For a typology of settlements in mass tort cases, with a special focus on aggregation, see
Erichson, supra note 37. In defining his typology of settlements, Erichson sets up two conditions
of settlement: conditionality and allocation. See id.at 1770. With respect to allocation, the Diet
Drugs class action settlement is a lump sum settlement distributed according to a matrix. With
respect to conditionality, as a result of Rule 23(b)(3) requirements, the settlement is a "walk away"
settlement-meaning claimants can opt out. See id.at 1784-95.
164. See Fiss, supranote 28, at 1461 (discussing the "pathologies" of bureaucracy in the courts
and arguing that increasing the organizational capacity of the judiciary is better than the alternatives
of "constricting jurisdiction" so that claims are limited or instituting "mass-production techniques").
165. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (mem.)
(allocating approximately $1 billion to Fund A to pay non-matrix benefits and $2.55 billion to Fund
B to pay matrix benefits).
166. See id. at *22. These "Fund B" claimants included persons with a certain level ofvalvular
heart disease who had taken the drugs for a prescribed period of time. See id.
167. See id.at *22.
168. See Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement with American Home Products Corp.
(as amended) at 38, Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re
Diet Drugs 1), 2000 WL 1222042 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (No. 99-20593), available at
http://www.settlementdietdrugs.com/pdfs/AmendedSettlement%20Agreement%20.pdf.
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employee of the trust would make a determination of compensation based
on review of a paper record. 69 Claimants did not need to show causation
but were required to submit echocardiograms to prove injury. 7 Other
claimants were only entitled to medical monitoring, or cash in lieu of
monitoring, and their claims were treated similarly across the board, rather
than according to a matrix.' Initial determinations were made by an
independent administrator
of the AHP Trust, who was to periodically
72
report to the court.
The complexities of the litigation increased following the settlement.
After the settlement was approved, the number of claimants exceeded the
parties' predictions."' The flood of claims created two significant
problems for the court and the litigants: the sufficiency of the fund and
sufficiency of the process. First, the possibility arose that the settlement
fund would not be sufficient to pay the increased number of claims. To
solve this problem, the parties agreed to an amendment (the "sixth
amendment") to the settlement agreement, permitting claimants to opt out
of the settlement if the fund became insolvent.'74 The opt-out limited
claimant rights by forbidding claimants who had opted out from claiming
punitive damages, naming additional defendants, joining other plaintiffs,
or consolidating their claims. 175 Because there remained the real possibility
that the fund would be exhausted, the parties negotiated a "seventh
amendment" wherein the defendant agreed to add an additional $1.275
billion to the fund for payment of matrix claims. 76 The seventh
amendment also reduced awards to the least damaged claimants.
The second problem created by the influx of demand concerned the
ability of the administrator to properly review claims. The original
settlement provided for quarterly audits by the administrator of the AHP
trust. The defendant could request an audit of up to ten percent of the
claims. 7 7 As a result of evidence of echocardiogram "mills" and an
169. See In re DietDrugs I, 2000 WL 1222042, at *23.
170. See id.at *19-22.
171. See id. at* 19.
172. See id. at *26. The Trust, created to invest and pay out the funds provided by AHP under
the settlement, was to be overseen by seven Trustees who were to serve through 2005. See id. at
*27.
173. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs I1), No. MDL 1203, Civ.A. 99-20593, 2002 WL 32067308, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26,2002).
174. See Prods. Liab. Litig., 385 F.3d 386, 391 (3d Cir. 2004)
175. Seeid.
176. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs 111), 226 F.R.D. 498, 510 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
177. See In re DietDrugsl, 2000 WL 1222042, at *23. Originally the settlement provided that
the trust administrator would audit 5% of the total matrix claims quarterly and that AHP would be
entitled to submit up to an additional 10% of matrix claims and 10% of non-matrix claims for audit.
See id.
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overabundance of claims-far exceeding the amount originally
predicted-the court granted a defense motion to audit all claims. 78 This
meant that the streamlined process envisioned in the original settlement
turned into a79cumbersome one of universal audits and increased likelihood
of appeals. 1
In addition to the audits, the initial settlement included a two-tiered
appeal system. First a dissatisfied claimant could appeal to a courtappointed arbitrator. Thereafter, either party could appeal to the court
directly, which would make a "final and binding" decision. 8 ° The seventh
amendment to the settlement agreement limited the appeals process to a
determinative appeal to the trust administrator rather than the multi-tiered
process available in the initial settlement.' 8' The influx of claimants thus
resulted in less process for the claimants with perhaps the most to lose:
those whose claims were rejected. On the other hand, the claims
administration process was expanded and streamlined by hiring additional
reviewing
cardiologists to ensure that all claims would be reviewed within
82
a year.
This case study illustrates the central tensions in court-sponsored
bureaucracy: between efficiency and accuracy, and between liberty and
equality. The familiar tradeoff between cost, speed, and accuracy 83 was
resolved in different ways at different points of the negotiation as
evidenced by the changes between the first iteration of the settlement,
permitting only fifteen percent of claims to be audited and allowing a twotiered appeal system, and the final iteration, permitting only one appeal
and requiring review of all claims. Whether these tensions were
appropriately resolved in this litigation remains an open question.
Certainly the defendants could not have felt that they received the "global
peace" that they were searching for. Plaintiffs gained access to
compensation and (relatively) speedy resolution, perhaps at the expense
178. See In re DietDrugs II, 2002 WL 32067308, at *5; In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,
236 F. Supp. 2d 445,460-65 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Shortly after the court ruled that the Trust need not
pay the claims from two law firms and a number of cardiologists that had been found to have
submitted large numbers of medically unreasonable claims, the court granted defendants' motion
to audit all matrix claims. See In re Diet Drugs II, 2002 WL 32067308, at *6.
179. This approach does not seem to be the most logical, but it is the one that defendants asked
for and the court approved. A better solution might have been to audit a randomly selected sample
of claims. For a thoughtful discussion of the possibilities and pitfalls of such an approach, see
Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process
Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1993).
180. Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 1203, Civ.
A. 99-20593, 2004 WL 220982, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2004).
181. See In re Diet Drugs III, 226 F.R.D. at 514.
182. See id. at 513-14.
183. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (requiring that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
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of protections that would give them a sense of trust in the validity of the
outcome.
Quasi-administrative agencies can provide a privatized version of the
legal system or a process that differs radically from traditional
adjudication. One of the ways that some consider the Diet Drugs
settlement a failure is the continued fighting between the parties that the
settlement engendered during the course of its administration. A partial
response to these criticisms that merits exploration is whether this conflict
was a good thing. Although disorder is not inherently good, here the
disorder meant that the inner workings of the private settlement
administration were exposed and that the court could intervene at various
stages to guarantee fairness.
IV. COURT RESISTANCE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PARADIGM

Regulatory failure increases risk in the market place that is likely to be
regulated through the tort system. At the same time, Congress has been
expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts over these same tort
cases. 84 Such changes include the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA),' 85 which might better have been called the "Class Action
Federalization Act" because it opened federal court jurisdiction to class
actions valued at over five million dollars where minimal diversity is
met,I8 6 and the Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002,187
which granted the federal courts jurisdiction over tort cases arising out of
accidents involving the death of at least seventy-five people.' Some view
the agenda behind these changes to be tort reform-driven, based on the
assumption that the federal courts will be less sympathetic to mass tort and
innovative tort claims than the state courts. 189

184. At the same time, suggestions have been made to limit the tort system by permitting FDA
determinations of product safety to preempt it. For a critique of such proposals see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preeamble: FederalAgencies and the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (exploring the recent trend of judicial deference to agency
preemption determinations); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing
Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role ofLitigation,5 YALE J. HEALTHPOL'Y L. & EmIcs 587
(2005) (concluding that product liability claims should be tried in federal court with the FDA
handling the technical questions).
185. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 1332, 1335, 1453, 1603, 1711-1715, 2071, 2074 (West 2007)).
186. See id. (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)).
187. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1369, 1687, 1785
(West 2007)).
188. See id.
189. See 151 CONG. REc. S450 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
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The debate about greedy plaintiffs' lawyers and individuals not getting
their due that the passage of the CAFA engendered is, at bottom, an
expression of distrust of bureaucracy as subject to alienation, capture, and
error. For example, Senator Kohl opened the debate on the CAFA by
evoking fear of alienation: "Right now, people across the country can be
dragged into lawsuits unaware of their rights and unarmed on the legal
battlefield. What our bill does is give back to regular people their rights
and representation."' 9 ° Kohl's comments also reveal a fear of capture:
"[M]ore and more frequently, some are taking advantage of the system
and, as a result, consumers are getting the short end of the stick, recovering
coupons or pocket change, while the real reward is going to others."' 91 As
Senator Hatch put it:
Unfortunately, the injuries caused by these abuses are not
confined to the parties who are named in the class action
complaint. Rather, they extend to everyday consumers who
unwittingly get dragged into these lawsuits as unnamed class
members simply because they purchased a cell phone, bought
a box of cereal, drove a car fitted with a certain brand of tires,
or rented a video. What we are really talking about is a
system that impacts the vast majority of people who live in
this country .... 192
The procedural innovations of the 1960s allowed plaintiffs to bring
large-scale litigation and as a result increased the volume of mass
production litigation in the courts. 93 More recently, we have seen a diction
as federal courts limit the use of class actions, especially at the
certification stage. 94 The federal courts, concerned about being overloaded
with cases and resistant to taking on the administration of vast numbers of
claims, have interpreted procedural rules narrowly to restrict litigated class
actions in federal courts. This might be described as the
"proceduralization" of tort law. By interpreting the class action rule
narrowly, judges have limited plaintiffs' access to the courts. The number
of lawsuits that bring the ideal of an individualized trial and the court's
limited resources into a crash course with one another are thereby
diminished. Because mass production wrongs continue, injured parties will
still bring suits. If the courts cannot or will not adjudicate these lawsuits,

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 150 CONG. REc. S7563 (daily ed. July 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
193. Some examples include the 1966 revision to Rule 23 and the passage of the Multidistrict
Litigation Act in 1968. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
194. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The ClassAction Counterreformation,57 STAN. L.REV. 1475,
1478 (2005).
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either litigants will be denied access to justice, or the cases will be diverted
from the courts to private ordering such as aggregative settlements. As one
proponent of class actions warned, "[I]t is far easier to curb class actions
than to avoid or reduce the mass frauds and disasters that create mass
misery and the need for workable aggregate litigation mechanisms.' 95
A. Certification:ManageabilityandPredominanceas Barriersto Suit
Certification is the greatest barrier to bringing a class suit. In class
actions for money damages under Rule 23(b)(3), the two main ways that
courts limit certification are by finding the class unmanageable'96 or
holding that common issues do not predominate.197 The manageability
inquiry "encompasses the whole range of practical problems that may
render the class action format inappropriate for a particular suit."' 9 The
types of considerations that govern manageability include differing state
laws, different damages inquiries, and the need to conduct multiple trials.
Manageability limits on class actions are most prevalent in classes
certified for litigation. Courts have treated settlement-only class actions
differently, often permitting variations in damages or in state laws that
they would not countenance in the certification of a litigation class.' 99
Ostensibly this is because in a settlement-only class the settlement in itself
renders the litigation manageable.200 In reality, however, the tensions that
give rise to the manageability problems are still present. After all, if
different state laws apply to different claimants, should they all be treated
similarly in a settlement? Presumably, some claimants will be getting less
compensation than they would if the negotiated settlement was based
solely on the laws of their home state. In this case, to what extent should
we permit equality to trump individualism?

195. Id.at 1477.
196. See, e.g., Andrews v. AT&T Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Because we
conclude that the district court erred in determining that the proposed class actions would be
manageable under Rule 23(b)(3), we reverse the court's order certifying the classes and removal
for further proceedings.").
197. See, e.g., Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1367 (1 th Cir. (2002) ("Thus, the class
must be decertified... because individual issues will overwhelm any common issues.").
198. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)(D).
199. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 529 (3d Cir. 2004)
("[W]hen dealing with variations in state laws, the same concerns with regards to case
manageability that arise with litigation classes are not present with settlement classes, and thus
those variations are irrelevant to certification of a settlement class.").
200. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (providing that in a
settlement-only class certification, "a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried,
would present intractable management problems... for the proposal is that there be no trial"). The
exception to this general trend in favor of settlements is the case of future claimants.
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The preference for settlement-only classes is a strong indication of
judicial distrust of administration.2"' The different approach to settlementonly and litigation classes creates, at least sometimes, an incentive for
plaintiffs' attorneys to settle cases. Settlement creates a privatized
bureaucracy that does not require the level of court oversight and direct
management that a litigated class action might. Although courts formally
retain jurisdiction over settlements, they generally do not participate
actively in their administration and often do not call attorneys to account
after the settlement administration is complete. Because manageability
standards with regard to settlement-only classes need not be the same as
those applied to a litigated class action, it is considerably easier to obtain
certification for an existing settlement than for a litigation class action.
This means that class action litigation is driven in the direction of private
settlements presented to the courts for approval rather than thoroughly
litigated before the court and requiring a judicially created administrative
system to resolve claims. It is important to remember, however, that both
litigated class actions and settlements carry the imprimatur of the court
system.
Additionally, in order for a money damages class action to be certified,
the plaintiff must show that the common issues in the class action
predominate over those issues requiring individualized proof.20 2 Even
when all the potential class members suffered the same wrong at the hands
of the same defendant, common issues may not predominate. Damages
determinations may be too individualized, or may require the application
of different state laws resulting in different liability standards or damages
for each individual claimant. Predominance is a question of degree; where
the line is drawn is up to an individual court's discretion and depends in
part on the judge's analysis of the substantive claims. Courts have often
stringently applied the predominance requirement.2 3
201. Positing that judges simply want to reduce their caseload is not a satisfying explanation,
in part because it gives judges too little credit. As Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the Southern District
of Texas told me, judges are looking for interesting, challenging cases. Interview with Lee H.
Rosenthal, U.S. Dist. Court Judge, S.D. Tex., in Kansas City, Mo. (Apr. 7,2006). Instead, they are
faced with many repetitive, routine, and simplistic cases. There is something deeper going on, and
I believe that this deeper concern is a distrust of bureaucracy. The judicial preference for
settlements is a strong indicator of this because settlements still require some judicial involvement,
as the Diet Drugs litigation illustrates. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. The
difference is that as a formal matter, the parties, not judges, create the settlement administration.
202. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623 ("The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.").
203. See, e.g., Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying class
certification in antitrust case involving genetically modified seeds because of the individualized
proof required); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695 (11 th Cir. 2004) (denying class certification
in Title VII case on grounds that plaintiffs failed to establish pattern and practice of discrimination);
Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2004) (denying certification in toxic tort case
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The story of In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.2° 4 provides a particularly

extreme example of the push towards settlement of collective litigation.2 °5
In that case, the Seventh Circuit overturned certification of a class of
hemophiliacs who alleged that the defendant's blood products had been
tainted with HIV. 206 The court relied on two rationales for denying
certification. First, the court held that because the individuals were
governed by different state laws and suffered different degrees of harm,
plaintiffs could not meet the predominance and manageability
requirements. 2 7 The concern regarding individualized damages has also
been the catalyst for denying certification in tort cases such as RhonePoulenc where the tort is considered "immature"-the idea being that
more individual litigation will provide a better guide to what the projected
damages determinations might be.2°8 Second, the opinion expressed
concern that certification of a class action would be devastating to the
blood products industry. 2 9 This highly influential rationale is an extremely
problematic reason to deny certification in a mass tort. Not only is the
effect of certification on an industry not a justifiable consideration under
Rule 23,210 the rationale provides immunity from suit for defendants that
engage in mass production harms on a grand scale.
In the aftermath of the denial of certification, the plaintiffs in the
Rhone-Poulenc case settled for a set amount per claimant.2 1 In reviewing
the approval of the settlement, the court of appeals noted that payment of
the same amount to each claimant given their differing injuries was
"downright weird," but nevertheless affirmed.2 12 Why would a court be
disinclined to permit litigation of a mass production claim as a single case
yet approve a settlement of that same series of claims? Should not the
heterogeneity of claims that was the basis for denial of certification require
rejection of a settlement based on homogeneous awards? One plausible
explanation is that the court rejected the class as a result of resistance to
in part on the basis of individualized remedies sought, including medical monitoring); George
Lussier Enters., Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.N.H. 2003) (denying
certification based on different legal standards applicable to plaintiffs in different states).
204. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
205. The story of this case is ably retold in DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS 293-312 (2000).
206. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1295, 1304.
207. See id.
at 1296-1304.
208. See Cabraser, supra note 194, at 1481-82 (citing cases denying class certification on the
basis of immature tort theory).
209. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298-1300.
210. See Cabraser, supranote 194, at 1482 (citing Kay v. Humana, 382 F.3d 1241, 1272 (11 th
Cir. 2004)).
211. See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th
Cir. 1998).
212. Id.at 1018.
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overseeing the administration of masses of claims, whereas the court felt
comfortable with private resolution that did not require it to do the
administrating. Some judicial oversight is required because settlements are
subject to the requirements of Rule 23(e), but that oversight may be
limited to the fairness hearing.2 1 3 According to the court's logic, if the
representatives of the parties have privately come up with a resolution,
even one that does not take into account the actual amounts plaintiffs
might obtain under differing state laws, it is more acceptable than the
courts being directly involved in the creation of a similar type of
bureaucratic resolution to the litigation. The court preferred that the
difficult tradeoffs be made by someone else. Such privatizing pushes
bureaucracy to the margins, but does not eliminate it.
The concern with institutional competence-that is, the argument that
the legislature, not the courts, should be policing massive private
wrongdoing of this type-ignores the problem rather than addressing it.
We can hope that the legislature would prevent the harm before it happens
through strong regulation, but advocating that approach does not mean one
should not think about what courts ought to do with large numbers of
claims that arise out of a mass production harm. Where the regulation has
failed, refusal to certify a class is an abdication of the courts' proper role.
If we unpack the concern about institutional competence, it is at bottom a
concern about administration in the court system. The root of the
competence argument must be that the courts are not the appropriate place
to mete out a large-scale remedy because courts are competent only to try
individualized cases. But as Justice Breyer wrote in his dissent in Ortiz v.
2 4 "when 'calls for national legislation' go unanswered,judges
Fibreboard,
can and should search aggressively for ways, within the framework of
existing law, to avoid delay and expense so great as to bring about a
massive denial of justice. 2 5 The question remains what the outlines of
such aggressive searches for justice ought to look like.
B. After Certification:Antisuit Injunctions,Appellate
Review, and CollateralAttack
The manageability and predominance limits set by the federal courts
matter more after the passage of CAFA. Permitting removal puts the
certification decisions in the jurisdiction of the federal courts because the
federal courts have given denials of certification preclusive effect-even
though the absent class members had no opportunity to opt out or receive

213.
a hearing
214.
215.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring all settlements to be approved by a judge only after
and a finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate).
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Id. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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notice-because these due process protections do not attach until a class
action is certified.216 On the other hand, federal court decisions to reject
as unfair are not preclusive, permitting reverse auctions in state
settlements
2 17
court.

The availability of appellate review of the predominance and
manageability inquiries, as well as other aspects of certification, is another
way of limiting the class action mechanism for redressing mass production
wrongs in the courts. The rules permit interlocutory review of any district
court decision either denying or granting class certification.218 Although
the standard of review of the factual findings giving rise to certification
orders is the deferential abuse of discretion standard,2 19 appellate courts
applying that standard have reviewed the factual basis for granting
certification so closely as to be accused of reviewing decisions de novo.22 °
But even where appellate review is properly deferential, the mere
availability of interlocutory review may create a litigation dynamic that
encourages settlement (because of the added transaction costs that appeals
pose), or encourage the district courts to be more reticent to grant
certification. This is not meant to disparage a less deferential, more
searching standard of review of district court certification decisions or
fairness hearings. 221 Nevertheless, the availability of appeal and
application of the standard of review can result in curbing administration
in the courts as district court judges seek to avoid being reversed.
The greatest concerns over the proper administration of mass torts arise
when the claims being administered are those of future claimants. These
are individuals who have yet to suffer the harm at issue, may not even

216. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th
Cir. 2003). But see Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 414 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005)
(approving district court's denial of injunction where case had been actively litigated in state court).
217. For example, the Third Circuit rejected a coupon settlement in In re General Motors
Corp.Pick-Up Truck Fuel TankProductsLiabilityLitigation,but that settlement was subsequently
re-filed and approved with some changes in Louisiana state court. See In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental
PrinciplesforClassAction Governance,37 IND. L. REV. 65, 79 n.56 (2004) (describing the history
of the General Motors lawsuit).
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (stating that "[a] court of appeals may in its discretion permit
an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this
rule.").
219. See Simon II Litig. v. Phillip Morris U.S.A. Inc. (In re Simon II Litig.), 407 F.3d 125,
132 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing the standards of review of district court certification decisions as
requiring either a clear error of law or fact, or a decision that 'cannot be located within the range
of permissible decisions"' (quoting Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.
2001))).
220. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,630-31 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(accusing majority of reviewing district court's findings of fact improperly).
221. See Lahav, supra note 217, at 138 (proposing alternative standards of review).
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know they were exposed to harm, and are therefore unable to opt out or
object. Future claimants embody the conflict between the backwardlooking purpose of adjudication as traditionally understood and the
forward-looking purpose of regulation.2 22 Damages litigation is backwardlooking because it attempts to provide redress for wrongs that have already
occurred. Courts cannot turn back the clock, so they compensate victims
for the harm they have already experienced with money.223 Regulation, by
contrast, attempts to prevent harms from occurring in the first place, and
in this sense is forward-looking. In class action settlements of future
claims, the individuals who are to be compensated have not yet been
harmed or are not yet aware of their harm, and therefore cannot come
before the court. The court is asked to approve a settlement that provides
for compensation in the future, when these future claimants' harm actually
emerges. The problem is that these future claimants cannot represent
themselves before the court, and this rightfully triggers concerns that their
interests will be compromised in favor of current claimants. 224 This was
the U.S. Supreme Court's fear in Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor,225
which attempted to set limits on settlement class actions where future
claimants were involved. 226 As a result, future claimants can disturb
settlement through collateral attack.2 27
The possibility of collateral attack makes "global peace" more difficult
for defendants to obtain. This may not be such a bad thing in cases where
there is suspicion of collusion between class counsel and defendants or
where side deals put the integrity of class counsel in question. But at the
same time, it may hinder mass settlement in cases where there is sufficient
individual stake to bring a collateral attack. Furthermore, it may encourage
settlement of existing cases through aggregation rather than the class
mechanism, a practice that is not subject to judicial supervision in the
same way that a class action settlement is. One question that bears asking
222. But see DAN-COHEN, supra note 9, at 128-35 (questioning the dichotomy between
regulation and arbitration functions of adjudication and arguing that because "organizations
augment the social ramifications ofjudicial decisions, they incline the judge toward the regulatory
mode").
223. There are of course exceptions to this, such as injunctive remedies.
224. See Alan B. Morrison & Brian Wolfinan, Representing the Unrepresented in Class
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 439,451-56 (1996). This was the concern in
the Georginesettlement. See supra note 58.
225. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
226. See id. at 626-29.
227. The possibility of collateral attack makes settlements less appealing to defendants and
may also make approval of settlements less appealing to judges because it disturbs global peace.
For example, although the temporary administrative agency created by Judge Weinstein in the
Agent Orange litigation was ostensibly closed in 1994, two collateral attacks reopened that
litigation. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257-59 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd in part
and vacatedin part, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (per curiam).
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is whether individual suits would be a better form of addressing the
problem of future claimants than an administrative solution offering the
possibility that future claimants will be treated with some measure of
equality as compared with present plaintiffs.
C. Some Limitations Outside the Class Action Context
Finally, there has also been some retrenchment in aggregation outside
of class actions. Judges are increasingly wary of aggregating cases before
them for consolidated trials.228 The provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1407
permitting the MDL Panel to transfer cases to a central court for pretrial
proceedings has also been curbed. After the passage of the MDL
legislation, it was the practice of the transferee district court to either
assign itself jurisdiction to hear the trial portion of the litigation or, at its
discretion, remand the cases back to their original courts. This practice
ended in 1998 when the U.S. Supreme Court, interpreting the statute
strictly, held that such a "self-assigning" practice required a revision of the
statute and was not within the powers of the courts.229 Since that time,
several bills have been presented to permit transferee courts to retain
jurisdiction over the trial phase of such cases, but none have been enacted
into law.23 0 Finally, commentators have noted increased resort to
"alternatives to traditional, formal class certification to accomplish at least
some of its aggregative and preclusive advantages," including joinder and
partial issue certification.23 ' While these approaches may have some
advantages, they encourage settlement and privatization of claims
resolution rather than robust judicial involvement. The trend, therefore, is
towards limitations on court-created claims administration and the
expansion of privately created claims administration systems.
V. TOWARD A HUMANIZING THEORY OF COMPLEX LITIGATION

Judges' perception that the courts are not the appropriate place to
administer resolution of mass claims is a significant barrier to the
development of a theory of humanized claims administration in the
courts.232 Judicial concerns about the competence of the courts to
228. See Deborah Hensler, Judge John W. Ford Professor ofDispute Resolution, Stanford Law
School, Address at the University of Connecticut School of Law (Nov. 3, 2005).
229. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998)
(holding that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 authorizes transfer for pretrial purposes only).
230. See Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. (2005);
Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004); Multidistrict,
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 107th Cong. (2001).
231. Cabraser, supra note 194, at 1478.
232. One prominent exception is Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York.
See WEINSTEIN, supra note 94.
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administer mass claims have resulted in the narrowing of doctrines to limit
court oversight and encouraged private administration of claims through
settlement. Accordingly, the first step to solving the problem of claims
administration in the courts must be an argument in favor of judicial
competence to administer claims. After the appropriateness, adequacy, and
necessity of court administration of claims is accepted, we can start to
think about what a humanized administration of mass torts might look like.
A. JudicialCompetence to Administer Claims
Is it a problem when a court engages in something that resembles
administration, as court-created quasi-administrative agencies do, without
direct participation or legislative mandate? This question is at heart one of
judicial competence. As Alexander Bickel described it: "The search must
be for a function which might (indeed, must) involve the making of
policy . . . ; which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the courts;
which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do not assume
it. . .""' Some have argued that the courts ought to embrace Bickel's
"passive virtues" and use procedural techniques to avoid decisions.2 34 In
a similar vein, judges have argued in favor of structural judicial restraint
to avoid usurping power from other branches of government.235 These
types of arguments are unconvincing for two reasons. First, the power to
resolve claims is at the heart of the courts' role. Second, the function of
adjudicating torts 2is36 "not likely [to] be performed elsewhere if the courts
do not assume it."
Although the trend is toward limiting access to the courts by narrowing
procedural doctrines, alternative interpretations exist and may even be
experiencing a resurgence.237 Judges have the discretion to bifurcate
liability from damages in order to accommodate certification.238 They may

233. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press
1986) (1962).
234. Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
FederalCourtsofAppeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685,690 (2001) ("[T]he courts of appeals are urged
to explore Alexander Bickel's 'passive virtues'--techniques for the avoidance of premature lawmaking-as a means of relieving institutional pressures ... ").
235. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (noting that the benefits
of a "grand-scale compensation scheme is a matter fit for legislative consideration but it is not
pertinent to the predominance inquiry"); POSNER, supra note 11, at 318 (advocating that the power
of the court system, relative to other branches of government, be reduced but noting that this
principle is contextual and dependent on time and place).
236. BICKEL, supra note 233, at 24.
237. See Cabraser, supra note 194, at 1478-79.
238. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Visa (In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig.), 280
F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[C]ommon issues may predominate when liability can be
determined on a class-wide basis, even when there are some individualized damage issues."); Krell
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create subclasses based on choice of law or type of injury.23 9 Judges could
interpret the predominance and manageability requirements more loosely
to permit certification.240 In sum, courts have it within their discretion to
make judicial administration of mass torts possible.
The difference between mass cases and ordinary cases is in scale, not
in kind.24 ' If the question is whether the courts have the skills and the
wisdom to determine or oversee the determination of liability and
compensation, clearly that is within their competence. Arguably, however,
the difference in scale results in a difference in the kind ofjustice that can
be provided because we live in a world of process scarcity. The scale of
the problem requires some type of administrative solution, and it is not
surprising, given the strength of the day-in-court ideal, that courts might
balk at this. For this reason the competence argument retains some power.
If judges decide to avoid administration of mass claims for structural
reasons, they are not ceding power to legislatures, either state or federal.
Instead, they are ceding power to private actors who, history has proven,
harm masses of individuals in the absence of regulation.242 As Chief Judge
Parker explained in the context of the asbestos litigation, "It is not enough
to chronicle the existence of this problem and to lament congressional
inaction. The litigants and the public rightfully expect the courts to be
problem solvers."243 The structural separation of powers argument presents
a corollary to the false comparison between the day-in-court ideal and
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[C]ourts have expressed a willingness
to certify nationwide classes on the ground that relatively minor differences in state law could be
overcome at trial by grouping similar state laws together and applying them as a unit. This Court
has affirmed a class certification based on a 'creditable showing, which apparently satisfied the
district court, that class certification [did] not present insuperable obstacles' relating to variances
in state law." (quoting Sch. Dist. of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos, 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir.
1986))).
239. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4). Of course, subclasses also must meet the typicality and
commonality requirements of Rule 23(a).
240. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1272-73 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (finding that
certifying a class action of 600,000 physicians against health insurers would not cause
manageability problems), discussed in Cabraser, supra note 194, at 1478-84.
241. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 867 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ( "It is
the number of these cases, not their nature, that creates the special judicial problem.").
242. Private forms of ordering, such as arbitration, can provide due process protections or may
be a complete barrier to claims. ComparePaul R. Verkuil, PrivatizingDue Process, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 963,983-87 (2005) (describing the types of procedural protections available through private
mechanisms such as arbitration), with Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming,
Near-TotalDemise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 414-17 (2005) (arguing
that the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer products will eradicate class actions and, as
a result, leave consumers without redress).
243. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd and
remandedin part,vacated andremandedin part,andrev'dandrenderedinpart,151 F.3d 297 (5th
Cir. 1998).
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administrative justice. A comparison between courts and idealized
versions of other institutions is equally flawed. 2" The question is in part
are doing-or have the
empirical and in part normative: Which institutions
245
capacity to do--a better job than the courts?
Another way of reading the socio-political developments that have
caused the rise of mass claims in the federal courts is that Congress is
delegating the power to administer claims to the courts. The courts, as part
of the dialogue between the branches, may choose to accept the challenge.
Collective procedural devices such as the class action, multi-district
litigation, and consolidation are part of a larger legal structure that permits
the legislature to defer regulatory responsibility to the courts. When the
FDA fails to act, it invites the tort system to regulate risk.246 When these
tort claims are pursued individually through the court system and languish
for lack of access to adjudication, the courts must act one way or another.
Courts faced with this decision may deny access to justice to the
individuals and groups before them, but they also have the discretion to
provide access to justice through administrative approaches.
Both the argument that the courts are not competent to administer mass
torts because such a role constitutes administration rather than adjudication
in some essential way and the argument that in doing so, the courts are
usurping power properly held by the legislature, are weak.24 7 There are,
however, legitimate concerns about court administration of mass torts.
These concerns are the same ones that would be raised with respect to the
creation of administrative structures in any branch of government, and
they are the abiding concerns regarding bureaucracy generally: alienation,
capture, and error.
Distrust of bureaucracy is legitimate. Bureaucracy in the courts, as
elsewhere, is potentially dehumanizing, subject to abuse, and prone to
error. The modern world of mass production harms, weak regulation, and
a relatively robust tort system practically requires the acceptance of a form
of adjudication that is antithetical to our historically individualistic view

244. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text; see also POSNER, supra note 11, at 324
(making the point that the comparison between "real courts, warts and all, with an ideal vision of
other governmental institutions" is flawed, but also stating that "[]udges rarely have enough
information to be justified in bringing about far-reaching changes in the settled practices and
institutional arrangements of the society").
245. See generally Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 8 (explaining that proponents of judicial
restraint need to demonstrate whether courts do it better or worse than other institutions, not just
assume it).
246. At least so long as individual causes of action are not preempted. See Sharkey, supranote
184 (discussing recent trend of agency approval of legislature preempting state law).
247. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, JudicialPolicy Making and Litigation
Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617,663-64 (2003) (arguing that judges should and
do make much the same determinations as legislators in structural reform litigation).
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of litigation. Although greater regulatory oversight would have prevented
the type of mass production harms caused by Fen-Phen, so long as we
regulate risk through the tort system, we must accept that court
administration of mass claims is both inevitable and necessary.
Having accepted the necessity of claims administration in the courts,
at least under current conditions, a healthy distrust of the type of
bureaucracy needed to administer mass claims is both warranted and
valuable. Fear of alienation, capture, and error will most likely spur us to
reform administration. That fear should be used to our advantage. Rather
than allowing fear to drive claims administration to private ordering,
courts should harness it to humanize bureaucracy. I propose that judges do
so by making court administration publicly oriented.24 This points to a
need for envisioning publicly oriented claims administration within a
theoretical framework. What would a humanized bureaucracy look like?
In this closing section, I offer some modest proposals.
B. Building a Better Bureaucracy
In this section, I offer some preliminary thoughts on realizing a
humanized bureaucracy in the courts. Public values are critical to a
humanized bureaucracy in the courts. The elements of a public-regarding
claims administration structure include transparency, a commitment to
deliberation and communication with the persons affected, and a systemic
approach to justice and accuracy. Each of these elements is responsive in
various ways to each of the abiding criticisms of bureaucracy: alienation,
capture, and error.
A publicly oriented approach to administration of claims is both
necessary and valuable because a public orientation responds to the most
forceful criticisms of judicial bureaucracy and ensures that these worstcase scenarios are never realized. What is at stake in claims resolution is
substantive. The outcome of claims administration, because it is enabled
by the courts and disposes of claims that would otherwise be tried,
implicates the fundamental goals of the justice system. Claims
administration may be seen as a trust that the legislature has placed in the
courts. Privatization has a greater potential to erode legitimacy and
fairness in the court system than any administrative structure set up to
resolve mass claims within the court system. The deliberative value in
adjudication is lost when claims administration procedures are privatized
because judges are loath to interfere in private settlements once they are
approved, and because the illusion of consent allows judges to abdicate

248. See Jody Freeman, Extending PublicLaw Norms Through Privatization,116 HARV. L.
REv. 1285, 1285 (2003) (using the term "publicization" to describe the introduction of public law
values into privatization of governmental functions).
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responsibility for settlement outcomes.249 Judges are required to accept or
reject settlements as they are presented, and nothing in the Federal Rules
requires judges to oversee settlement administration, nor do judges often
require attorneys to report back on the administration of settlements.250
Thus, privatization results in the loss of a quintessential element of
adjudication: the "judicial obligations of conducting a reasoned inquiry,
articulating the reasons for decision, and subjecting those reasons to
appellate review. 251
The structure of quasi-administrative agencies is important because
bureaucracy is not merely a way to resolve claims; it implicates the
substance of justice. In other words, bureaucracies are not only a system
of organization, but also a system of social formation.252 The bureaucracy
of claims administration encourages the conditions of its own existence.
As claims are rationalized and streamlined, more claims are brought,
requiring greater bureaucratization, which in turn permits the assertion of
more claims. Even as the conditions for the institution of bureaucratic
structures in the courts flourish, the fear of bureaucracy causes the courts
to pass the buck to private parties, an endpoint that creates more potential
for abuse and reason for distrust. Distrust of administrative structures in
the courts stands in the way of creating a humanizing and deliberative
form of bureaucratic claims administration because fear encourages a
reification of bureaucracy.
Accordingly, it is doubly important that bureaucracy be structured in
a manner that is consonant with our vision of our government and
ourselves. Courts should foster a form of administration that allows access
to justice, and at the same time is humanizing, thoughtful and deliberative.
This approach keeps in mind Owen Fiss's statement that "[t]he function
of adjudication is to give meaning to public values, not merely to resolve
'
Bureaucracy should be understood as a dynamic set of
disputes."253
relationships that can be influenced, changed, and humanized to lead to a

249. Outcomes can be just as important an indicator of fairness as process. See David A. Dana,
Adequacy of RepresentationAfter Stephenson: A Rawlsian/BehavioralEconomics Approach to
Class Action Settlements, 55 EMoRY L.J. 279, 281 (2006) ("[A]lthough the adequacy of
representation inquiry certainly entails an examination into the presettlement structure of
representation and the content of the proceedings, the inquiry also has, or at least should have,
something to do with ex post substantive outcomes-about what the settlement actually delivers
in the way of relief to individual class members.").
250. See Lahav, supra note 217, at 91 nn.107 & 109.
251. Resnik, supra note 94, at 425-31 (arguing against managerial judging because it gives
judges vast power, undermines traditional constraints on the use of this power, and threatens
judicial impartiality by encouraging private and informal ordering).
252. See CLAUDE LEFORT, THE POLITICAL FORMS OF MODERN SOCIETY: BUREAUCRACY,
DEMOCRACY, TOTALITARIANISM 120 (1986).
253. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 44 (1979).
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more satisfactory form of legal decision-making. This is a very difficult
task because it requires resolving the tension between access to justice and
the right to be heard. This tradeoff exists because there are not enough
resources to provide a traditional, individualized hearing to every claimant.
The problems posed by court bureaucracies are deep and abiding
problems that we have been struggling with since the founding of our
Republic, and that political philosophers struggled with long before that.254
What is the appropriate tradeoff between liberty and equality? What is the
effect of the pursuit of self or group interest, or both, on the polity, and
what, if any, possibility is there to rely on our better nature? To what
extent is it possible to create structures for administration in society that
limit, if not eradicate, alienation, capture, and error?
A legal process approach does little to help the problems created by
court bureaucracies because, based as it is on the day-in-court ideal, it has
already declared itself willing to give up access to justice in favor of
individualism. Thus it assumes a resolution to the tension between liberty
and equality that is at the heart of the matter. It is the resolution to this
tension we need to unpack, discuss, and debate. In resolving this tension,
process will not be the only consideration because the method of process
necessarily implicates substance. Take, for example, the Diet Drugs
settlement described earlier. Recall that it is ordinarily the trust, not the
courts or the public, that pays the costs of administering claims as well as
the value of the claims themselves.255 If the defendants are given the right
to appeal every claim, then administrative costs increase, the fund is
depleted, and there is less money to go to individual claimants. If the
claimants are given a back-end opt-out, as they were in the Diet Drugs
litigation, the claims administration facility may be driven to give more to
individuals in order to keep them from exercising their opt-out, and this
may deplete the fund, leaving other claimants with less, or this may require
the parties to secure additional funding. 5 6
In evaluating the function of court bureaucracy, we must look both at
the manner in which these bureaucracies resolve claims and at the
substantive results that they reach. It will likely mean different types of
process for different types of claims. 5 7 For example, there will be some
254. For a wonderful survey of intellectual history on these issues, see ALBERT 0.
HiRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE

ITS TRIUMPH (1977).
255. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.) (In re Diet
Drugs 1), Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (mem.).
256. See McGovern, supra note 32, at 1386 ("Back end opt-outs can put pressure on a facility
to raise individual compensation beyond existing resources or to secure additional funding beyond
what was originally viewed as a final amount.").
257. This suggestion is analogous to the suggestion made by Jerry Mashaw, that a qualitative
view of what is at stake in administrative hearings is necessary to determine how much process is
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cases where uniform compensation to every claimant, that is, an emphasis
on equality, will be fair from a distributional perspective. In other cases,
such as when individuals have suffered radically different damages, a
matrix with compensation calibrated to each individual's loss, that is, an
emphasis on liberty values, will be necessary. There will be similarities in
analysis even if the construction of the actual administrative system will
be different. In overseeing the formation of claims administration
facilities, judges always ought to be concerned with reinforcement of
public process values such as openness, deliberation, and communication,
as well as with substantive values such as compensation to individuals,
distribution among claimants, and deterrence.
Initially, the difficult tradeoffs between justice in the individual case
and access to justice for large numbers of claimants ought to be made
publicly rather than shunted off to a system that is more convenient
because it is run by private parties. While a public-regarding quasiadministrative agency in the courts could theoretically be created either by
judges or by parties, I call it "public" because I mean to invoke the idea of
openness that the word implies, in contradiction to a "private"--that is,
hidden-type of resolution. Because of this requirement of openness,
judges play a critical role in the development of these quasi-administrative
agencies bearing the imprimatur of the courts. This suggestion is in line
with the legal process tradition, emphasizing the value of public
adjudication leading to reasoned opinions. 58
Transparency is critical to a humanized bureaucracy because it makes
claimant responses to the claims administration facility possible. Control
over information is power, and by allowing all the players to have access
to information and to the decision-making process of the bureaucracy, that
power is dispersed. This distribution of power does some work towards the
goal of preventing capture because it allows for the possibility of
opposition to specific interests taking advantage of the litigation. Without
access to information, the possibilities for opposition are severely limited.
Additionally, a fundamental aspect of legitimacy is that decisions are
visible. Even perfectly just decisions are suspect if hidden. Part of the fear
engendered by bureaucracy is of what goes on behind closed doors or in
the darkened corridors of a Kafka novel.
On a similar note, deliberation is critical to the approval of claims
administration facilities. As Justice Brandeis put it, judges are respected

due. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REv. 28, 57-59 (1976).
258. See generally Jonathan T. Molot, An Old JudicialRole for a New Litigation Era, 113
YALE L.J. 27 (2003) (arguing in favor of Lon Fuller's conception of adjudication as applied to the
complex litigation context).
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"because we do our own work."25 9 Judicial approval of quasiadministrative agencies should never be automatic, and this principle
should probably extend to aggregative settlements, as well as class actions
and bankruptcies. ° Instead, in approving the creation of claims
administration facilities, judges should look at these facilities as an
extension of their own work and as a kind of public entity.
One concrete proposal for realizing the values of openness and
deliberation could be to mandate that critical functions of claims
administration be publicly managed rather than managed by parties. For
example, in the DietDrugs litigation, a publicly managed echocardiogram
program could have been implemented to prevent abuses. Such a program
would both have prevented errors and reduced the possibility of capture of
the echocardiogram process by one party or another. Furthermore, judges
could use the requirement under Rule 23(e) to provide a reasoned opinion
in approving a settlement that sets forth the structure and goals of the
" ' This
settlement administration facility and reasons for its approval.26
requirement could be made more robust by the inclusion of specific goals
for the quasi-administrative agency against which the performance of the
agency can be judged. Such judicial approval should also be required in
aggregative settlements under the auspices of MDL judges, which is not
currently the case. For example, judges should determine maximum
acceptable error rates.262 Furthermore, pursuant to their continued
oversight of settlements, judges should be required to oversee an audit of
the performance of the agency and publish an evaluation of the extent to
which the agency is meeting the goals set forth in the settlement. Early
judicial involvement and the public management of various aspects of
claim collection and administration are more likely than audits to prevent
the situation from reaching a crisis point requiring extreme measures that
change the balance reached in the settlement, as was the case in the Diet
Drugs litigation.
259. McCree, supranote 11, at 778. Similarly, D.C. Circuit Judge Wald has written that the
"historic strength" of the courts is "having a personalized judiciary make decisions through the
application of impersonalized rules." Patricia M. Wald, BureaucracyandtheCourts, 92 YALE L.J.
1478, 1483 (1983) (arguing that this approach is endangered by bureaucracy in the court system).
260. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) (holding that limited find
class actions require showing that the fund was limited by more than agreement of the parties and
that conflicting interests ofpresent and future class members require sub-classification and separate
representation); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (affirming denial of
certification for settlement of current and future asbestos claims); In re Combustion Eng'g, 391
F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting prepackaged bankruptcy).
261. I am grateful to Martha Minow for this suggestion.
262. See McGovern, supra note 32, at 1387 (describing minimal goals for potential claims
resolution facilities including horizontal equity; longitudinal equity; finality; erring on the side of
fixed terms; empirical confidence in the projections of the parties; independence, neutrality, and
experience of the entities or persons administering the facility; defined error rates; and continued
judicial supervision).
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So far, this theory is very dependent on judges. If we cannot rely on
process to produce good results, we are left to rely on the discretion and
judgment of judges. One criticism of judicial oversight is that it depends
on the virtue and talents of the judges.263 This may be a problem if we fear
that judges will be elitist, inexpert, or dictatorial.' 6 The problem of
mistrust of decision-makers, be they judges, legislators, or administrators,
is ubiquitous. Demanding more virtue on the part of private actors, judges,
and legislators, rather than encouraging interest competition, is no solution
because the other side of this coin is elitism and capture.265 On the other
hand, as compared to bureaucrats or legislators, federal judges are less
subject to capture because they have life tenure and a professional ethos
of neutrality. Ifjudges deliberate on their decisions and publicly announce
them, as is traditionally required, many of these concerns can be alleviated.
While informal decision-making may be necessary to bring some
settlements of collective litigation to fruition, this does not mean that the
settlements should not be publicly debated and discussed, and the judges'
thoughtful reasoning in favor, or against, be publicized to the persons
affected and the public at large.
The second value that a theory might emphasize is communication.
Much has been written on public deliberation as a democratic value 266 and
a judicial one.267 Communication and transparency are linked in that
transparency requires the dissemination of information through
communication. Dialogue in this context is a messy business because there
263. Another criticism maybe that this type of reliance on judges is inquisitorial. See Amalia
D. Kessler, Our InquisitorialTradition: Equity Procedure,Due Process, and the Search for an
Alternative to the Adversarial,90 CORNELL L. REv. 1181, 1184-85 (2005) (describing resistance
to and criticisms of inquisitorial practices, particularly the appointment of special masters, in the
federal courts). But see Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and InquisitorialJustice, 87
GEO. L.J. 1983, 1985-86 (1999) (hailing the trend towards inquisitorial justice in mass tort cases
as "salutary").
264. See Minow, supra note 33, at 2028 ("Outside the sphere of the adversary process and the
rule-bound trial system, the settlement process permits room for personal persuasion, input, or
pressure by the judge."); see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRiAL 128-31, 158-59

(1987) (describing Judge Jack Weinstein's creation of a "new choice-of-law doctrine... that he
could use to shape... the outcome of the case" and his insistence upon the settlement amount he
deemed most fair); Lahav, supra note 217, at 114-15 (describing criticisms ofjudicial oversight of
class actions).
265. Neo-republican theorists argued in favor of virtue in public life, but were criticized for
basing their arguments on ideologies that had at their origin been based on exclusion on the basis
of wealth, color, and gender. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM

175-77 (1996) (describing criticisms of neo-republicanism as a historical, archaic, "elitist and
patriarchal," and "reactionary").
266. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, DeliberativeDemocracyBeyond Process,
in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 233, 233 (Colin Farrelly ed., 2004) (arguing for the
inclusion of both substantive and procedural principles in a deliberative democratic theory).
267. See supranote 14 and accompanying text (discussing the Hart-Hand model ofjudging).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

51

Florida Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 2

FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 59

will be disagreement over the structure of the administrative agency and
its substantive goals. This disagreement is necessary and valuable. It is in
this sense that the Diet Drugs litigation provides a beneficial example.
That litigation and settlement was by no means streamlined. Its evolution
involved multiple amendments, applications to the court, and a
complicated system for administering claims that required increasing
oversight as the enormity of the settlement was realized. All of this was
costly and required substantial time and effort by the court and the
litigants. Nevertheless, this messiness should also be seen as the result of
a productive dialogue between the court, parties, and claimants in which
errors and fraud were exposed and values of access and compensation
affirmed.
Courts might realize communication values by ascertaining that all the
affected parties-trustees, defendants, future claimants, present claimants,
and administrators of the facility-are involved in the negotiations, for
example.26 Various interested parties, especially claimants, should also
have the opportunity to communicate with the court about their
dissatisfaction with aspects of the administration for auditing purposes as
the settlement is administered over time.269 If it were possible, the court
would also solicit the opinions of qualified potential future claimants,
although this scenario is difficult to imagine because the nature of the
future claimants is that they do not yet know that they have a claim. After
the settlement administration is underway, the judge can meet with
randomly selected claimants who have been through the process to
determine the extent to which the administrative agency is meeting
expectations. Such a proactive approach may be especially warranted in
light of empirical evidence that objections to class action settlements are
extremely uncommon. 70 The claimants need not be randomly selected, but
should not be selected in a manner that raises concerns about capture. That
is, they should not represent or be coached by one side or the other. Such
meetings would serve the dual purpose of providing information about the
administration of claims and putting a human face to the claimants to

268. See McGovern, supra note 32, at 1388.
269. So far, the structure I am describing has some similarities to the methods for overseeing
informal rulemaking in the administrative context, which requires notice, comment, and a published
statement of the basis and purpose alongside the rules. Cf Verkuil, supra note 242 (describing the
types of process provided by private entities and advocating in favor of a Private Administrative
Procedure Act requiring certain minimal informal adjudication procedures).
270. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role ofOpt-Outs andObjectors in Class
Action Litigation:TheoreticalandEmpiricallssues, 57 VND. L. REV. 1529, 1533-34, 1550 (2004)
(showing that the objection rate is low across case types). The study does not seem to have been
controlled for talent or tenacity of objectors. It is possible that even one objector who is very ably
represented can have an effect larger than the numbers would show. The findings did indicate a
very small number of rejected settlements, at least in published opinions. See id. at 1558-59.
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mitigate the extent to which claimants are alienated from the judge
because they are invisible to her.
Finally, the substantive accomplishment of this bureaucracy must be
evaluated based on its ability to achieve systemic justice rather than
focusing on justice in the individual case.2 7 ' This means very openly
favoring equality over liberty. Thus, for example, adjudication by
sampling could be used.2 72 The sample could be historical cases that have
been adjudicated or settled, or a group of concurrent cases. The total
compensation would be determined by extrapolating the sample cases over
the claimant population. Each claimant could receive an amount that
represents an average of the sample awards, perhaps taking into account
relevant variables. The same limitations could be set on defendants by
permitting statistical sampling of claims to determine whether the error
rate of a given administrative agency was meeting the goal accepted at the
outset, rather than permitting universal audits of individual claims as
happened in the Diet Drugs litigation. This proposal essentially mandates
a lottery for process rights.2 73 Such a lottery may be justified on the basis
of the common good.
There are several problems with this proposal, however. First, the devil
is in the details. How exactly would a sampling system work? Who would
decide what cases are sampled; how would those cases be found; and who
would get to litigate them? Second, one court has held that sample trials
violate the defendant's Seventh Amendment right to have liability and
damages determined by a jury.2 74 Whether this challenge is fatal is beyond
the scope of this Article, but while it has not been broadly endorsed,
neither have statistical trials been much used. Third, even if the
constitutional problem could be overcome, either as a matter of
interpretation or by agreement of the parties, it would still mean tolerating
a level of acceptable error that might make proponents of the day-in-court
ideal feel uncomfortable.
I suggest two responses to this discomfort. The first is that a full blown
trial often does not lead to just individual results, such that the alternative
to which bureaucratic systems are being compared sets an illusory standard
that the ideal itself cannot meet.275 Second, the benefit of a systemic
271. See Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 247-48 (2004)
(defining systemic accuracy as "whether a given procedure will produce more or less accurate
results for all future cases" and noting that the term accuracy is ambiguous).
272. See generally Bone, supranote 179 (addressing the normative arguments for sampling
in mass tort litigation and suggesting guidelines for when sampling is appropriate).
273. See id. at 642-43.
274. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1998). But see Hilao
v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 785-87 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding sample damages in human
rights case against defendant's due process challenge).
275. See Michael J. Sacks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
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approach to mass cases is that it privileges the central democratic value of
access to justice. There are ways other than trials for the courts to
recognize the importance of deliberation and participation values, such as
holding hearings at various stages of the settlement and providing wellreasoned opinions as to the legitimacy of the process. Yet another difficult
argument against acceptance of bureaucracy in the courts is that individual
claims should be adjudicated consonant with the day-in-court ideal, and
that by doing otherwise, the courts are breaching their trust with the
legislature. As a co-equal branch of government, faced with the necessity
to do justice and a scarcity of process, the judiciary is left with little choice
but to pursue an administrative strategy. The question is not whether there
will be bureaucratic structures in the courts, but what those structures will
be like.
VI. CONCLUSION

Judicial concern about the pervasive rise of bureaucracy in the courts
has led to a fearful pushing of mass claims into private settlements, which
in turn has lead to a greater likelihood of the realization of the ills that we
fear from bureaucracy: that it alienates litigants from the court system,
increases judicial apathy, and can lead to unacceptably erroneous results.
The goal of this Article was to explore why there is bureaucratization in
the courts and how it operates. Now that we have achieved this, the next
step is to develop a theory of claims administration in the courts or in the
shadow of the law that is responsive to the problems described here. This
Article has begun that work by proposing a theory of publicly oriented
claims administration based on transparency, communication, and
systemic justice. Overseeing humanized and publicly oriented
administration of claims is a valuable goal for the federal courts. It may
not be handcrafted justice of the Hand-Hart variety, but administration
does not mean that the courts need to become an industrial sweatshop or
to send claimants to its equivalent.

Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 830-32
(1992) (arguing that the values of equality, predictability, transparency, rationality, and revelation
are well served by sampling, while autonomy and dignity values seem less well served by
comparison to the ideal of an individual trial, but perhaps less so in comparison to the reality).
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